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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper quantifies the likely benefits of trade and 
investment liberalization in a small, poor, open economy, 
using the accession of Honduras to the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement 
as a case study. The results show that bilateral trade 
liberalization with the United States is likely to have 
almost no effect on welfare in Honduras, while the 
reciprocal removal of protection vis-a-vis the rest of 
Central America would lead to significantly larger 
gains. Potential gains from increased net foreign direct 
investment inflows overwhelm those expected from 
trade reform alone, particularly if the new foreign 
direct investment generates productivity spillovers. 
This paper—a product of the Development Prospects Group—is part of a larger effort in the group to monitor and assess 
the economic implications of trade policy developments. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dmedvedev@worldbank.org.  
However, if it is to replace Honduran investment 
rather than complement domestic capital formation, 
growth performance is unlikely to improve and may 
even suffer. The paper's results identify several areas for 
policy attention by Honduran policy makers to make 
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade 
Agreement  more development-friendly. These include 
carefully considering the budgetary implications of trade 
reform, widening social safety nets to counter the trends 
toward increasing income inequality, and sequencing 
the reforms to ensure a close alignment of Honduras' 
comparative advantage on the regional and global 
markets.Preferential Liberalization and Its Economy-Wide Eects in
Honduras
Denis Medvedev
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The Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) was signed in
August 2004 after a year and a half of intensive negotiations between the US, the Dominican
Republic, and the members of the Central American Common Market (CACM): Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Many of the agreement's key provisions have
been a subject of much debate and uncertainty. In particular, is the marginal opening of the US
market likely to generate enough opportunities for DR-CAFTA exporters? Will the increase in
import competition lead to a decline of key sectors in the developing members? What will be the
public revenue implications of the agreement? Finally, what are the conditions under which the
developing partners can reasonably expect to reap signicant benets from DR-CAFTA?
This paper addresses the above questions for Honduras|the most open country in Latin Amer-
ica (as measured by the trade-to-GDP ratio) but also one of the poorest|by building a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Honduran economy and implementing a set of policy sim-
ulations aimed at illustrating the trade, production, consumption, and welfare implications of
DR-CAFTA. While reasonable care has been taken to model the provisions of DR-CAFTA as real-
istically as possible|including gradual phase-in of tari reductions, exclusion of key sectors (sugar
in the US), dierentiation between hub-and-spoke and multilateral implementation, etc.|the ob-
jective of this paper is not to develop a forecast of the future performance of the Honduran economy
but to illustrate challenges likely to face Honduran policy makers in the course of implementation
of DR-CAFTA. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oers a brief summary of the major
provisions of DR-CAFTA, while section 3 reviews the previous estimates of the likely eects of this
agreement. Section 4 discusses the data used in this exercise and the structural features of the
economy of Honduras in the base year. Section 5 introduces the main features of the CGE model.
Section 6 presents the results of trade reform simulations, while section 7 shows the outcomes of
scenarios that allow for DR-CAFTA trade liberalization to be accompanied by increased net FDI
inows. Section 8 oers concluding remarks.
2 Summary of DR-CAFTA
The main objective of DR-CAFTA is to lock in and expand the unilateral preferences granted to
Latin American members through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) programs, while simultaneously opening markets in Central America and
the Dominican Republic to US exports.1 In agriculture, virtually all products will eventually be
eligible for duty-free treatment, with the exception of sugar in the US, white maize in El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and potatoes and onions in Costa Rica (World Bank, 2006).
More than half of all current US farm exports are accorded zero tari treatment immediately, with
the duties on the remainder phased out over a 15{20 year horizon (USTR, 2005b). For Latin
American members, the agreement consolidates the existing preferences, introduces some exibility
in non-tari barriers (e.g., doubling the sugar quota), and pledges technical assistance to help meet
the US sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards for agriculture and food products. In manufacturing,
DR-CAFTA promises to eliminate all taris on industrial and consumer goods between member
countries, with 80 percent of current US exports becoming duty-free immediately (USTR, 2005b).
Half of the remaining products will see taris phased out over the next ve years, while the rest
1Currently, almost 80 percent of products from the Latin American members already enter the US duty-free due
to existing preferences (USTR, 2005a).
1are subject to 10 and 12-15 year schedules (World Bank, 2006). On the reciprocal side, close to
100 percent of exports by the Dominican Republic and CACM countries are aorded immediate
zero-tari treatment in the US (Francois et al., 2005).2
The liberalization of trade in services under DR-CAFTA represents a major expansion of the
disciplines of CBI and GSP, which largely ignore this subject. For most Central American countries
and the Dominican Republic, the main tenets of DR-CAFTA in services|opening of markets for
competition, national treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment|were already written into
the legislative and regulatory frameworks prior to DR-CAFTA. Therefore, the agreement mainly
involves the lock-in of these reforms and continued eorts at their implementation and enforcement.
However, the phase-in of many commitments is not immediate. For example, Latin American
countries have pledged to allow US-owned insurance branches in four years and are working toward
removing local residency requirements for the provision of professional services (World Bank, 2006).
For other areas, such as the supply of banking services, trade between CACM countries and the
Dominican Republic will not be liberalized for the rst two years of the agreement.
DR-CAFTA also covers a range of \deep integration" issues. The investment provisions pro-
vide comprehensive protections that go beyond WTO commitments and cover all investment areas:
enterprise, debt, concessions, contracts, investor-state dispute settlement, transparency (including
anti-corruption), and intellectual property (Francois et al., 2005). Together, these measures eec-
tively give US investors in the CACM countries and the Dominican Republic the same protections
as under the US law. Other beyond-the-border issues include government procurement, customs
cooperation, trade facilitation, trade capacity building, and labor and environment standards.
3 Previous Empirical Evaluations of DR-CAFTA
The uncertainty surrounding the potential costs and benets of DR-CAFTA for the US and Central
America has led to a fair amount of empirical research on the agreement even before its entry
into force. An early study by Hilaire and Yang (2003) used the GTAP5 database and model to
estimate large welfare gains of US$964 million for the United States and US$3,859 million for
Central America, with the bulk of the gains coming from a large expansion of exports of textiles
and clothing from Central America.3 Another study by Brown et al. (2004), using GTAP5 data but
applying it to a model with monopolistic competition under increasing returns to scale, estimated
much larger eects with welfare rising by US$17.3 billion (0.2 percent of GNP) in the US and US$5.3
billion (4.4 percent of GNP) in Central America. Most of the welfare gains in these simulations
come from the elimination of service barriers, but the results from merchandise trade alone are also
signicantly above those of Hilaire and Yang (2003).
A more comprehensive study of DR-CAFTA has been put together by the United States In-
ternational Trade Commission (USITC), which relied on the GTAP6 database for ner regional
disaggregation, signicantly improved protection data, and a 2001 base year.4 USITC (2004) made
2Only 19 products will continue to be subject to tari duties, and these barriers will be phased out over a 10 year
period (World Bank, 2006).
3The authors used equivalent variation as the welfare metric. The GTAP5 database has a base year of 1997; the
ve CACM members are grouped together with Belize, Panama, and 19 Caribbean nations to form a Central America
and Caribbean aggregate.
4GTAP6 draws its protection data from the MAcMaps database developed by Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). In contrast to GTAP5, the new data explicitly take into account preferential
taris and tari rate quotas (TRQs). Thus, estimates of gains from trade with GTAP6 tend to be signicantly below
those with the earlier database, since the initial level of protection is much lower. See World Bank (2004, chapter 1)
2further adjustments to the data by accounting for preferential taris in the US, Central America,
and the Dominican Republic that were not already captured in GTAP, moving the base year to
2005 (the expected date of DR-CAFTA's entry into force at the time of the study's writing), and
modifying the regional structure of the database to focus specically on DR-CAFTA member states.
The results show that the US welfare and GDP gains are very modest, reaching US$166 million and
US$228 million, respectively. USITC (2004) estimates that all US exports to DR-CAFTA partners
are likely to increase, led by sales of textiles, apparel, and leather products (US$803 million, or 15
percent above the base year). DR-CAFTA countries increase their exports of textiles, apparel, and
leather products by US$3 billion, while sales of sugar, meat, and dairy rise slightly and exports of
other products decline. USITC (2004) does not consider the liberalization of services in its analysis,
citing lack of reliable data on service barriers. While qualitative results for the US are similar to
Hilaire and Yang (2003), the size of the welfare gains is several times smaller than what is reported
in that study. This is consistent with the use of a much later base year and lower initial taris
in USITC (2004), which adopted a baseline that was more representative of the actual conditions
prior to the implementation of DR-CAFTA.
Francois et al. (2005) provide another assessment of DR-CAFTA using GTAP6, but without any
modications to the data. Their results show a welfare gain of US$116 million in the United States
and US$1,028 million in Central America. The eects on US output are positive but very small,
while the output of textiles and apparel in Central America rises by more than 40 percent with
other sectors experiencing small to moderate declines. Francois et al. (2005) also implement several
alternative simulations, including the likely eects of DR-CAFTA on FDI by endogenizing capital
accumulation and saving rates. This results in a nine percent increase in the Central American
capital stock and additional US$1,817 million welfare gain, while the US experiences an additional
US$131 million increase in welfare.5
All of the above studies have examined DR-CAFTA in the context of a global model, limit-
ing the scope of investigation to region-wide eects and ignoring potentially important country
heterogeneity within Central America. Thus far, only one study (Bussolo and Niimi, 2006) consid-
ered the eects of DR-CAFTA in a single-country framework. The authors show that real GDP in
Nicaragua could rise between 0.5 and 1.1, depending on assumptions about labor mobility. Imports
of agriculture in Nicaragua are likely to rise by 21 percent, while exports of agricultural products
and processed foods could increase by 5 and 6 percent, respectively. Most of the DR-CAFTA gains
to Nicaraguan economy are achieved through own liberalization, with the benets reduced by only
one-quarter if the US does not reciprocate with its own tari reductions. Furthermore, Bussolo
and Niimi (2006) nd that these adjustments represent more than three-quarters of the changes in
real GDP, exports, and imports that would be expected if Nicaragua were to unilaterally liberalize
vis- a-vis all of its trading partners.
The general conclusion from the above studies, with the exception of Brown et al. (2004), is that
welfare gains from DR-CAFTA are likely to be small|around 1 percent of GDP or less for Central
America and almost negligible for the US. Studies using more recent data, such as Francois et al.
(2005), tend to show lower welfare gains, consistent with the fact that average taris have been
declining since the mid-1990s. These results are in line with more general observations in Robinson
for additional details.
5The magnitude of the increase in capital stock appears fairly optimistic. Total investment (as a share of GDP) did
not signicantly increase in Mexico following the implementation of NAFTA, although FDI inows did expand. Other
than references to the relatively high current stock of US FDI in the region and the expected (but not quantied)
improvements in the investment climate, Francois et al. (2005) do not provide reasons why such a large increase in
total investment could materialize in Central America.
3and Thierfelder (2002), who review the CGE literature on the eects of preferential liberalization
and report that welfare gains in neoclassical models tend to be very modest. The results of Brown
et al. (2004), even when only merchandise trade reform is considered, are considerably larger than
the other estimates|again consistent with the observation of Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) that
\new trade" features such as imperfect competition or liberalization of services tend to generate
much larger improvements in welfare.
The main drawback of these studies is that even the most recent ones, with the exception of
USITC (2004), rely on tari data several years before the beginning of DR-CAFTA, and all but
Bussolo and Niimi (2006) focus on Central America as a whole. This ignores important dierences
across countries, adds countries that are not DR-CAFTA members, and prevents dierentiation
between tari reform within Central America and between Central American countries and the
US. Furthermore, all of the above studies tend to focus on comparative static gains and do not
address issues such as tari reduction phase-in periods or capital accumulation over time. Finally,
with the exception of Bussolo and Niimi (2006), who use a exible direct tax rate to maintain a
xed scal decit, it is not clear how the existing studies address the scal implications of lost
tari revenue. This paper addresses these drawbacks by focusing on Honduras, one of the smallest
and poorest countries in Central America. The pattern of tari cuts in this paper is designed to
approximate the provisions of DR-CAFTA more closely than the studies that simply eliminate all
import taxes on trade with the US, and the recursive dynamic nature of the model employed here
allows for gradual phase-in of these tari reductions. Furthermore, this paper provides a more
realistic assessment of DR-CAFTA outcomes by explicitly juxtaposing tari liberalization vis- a-
vis the United States with a more comprehensive DR-CAFTA reform (including all DR-CAFTA
members) and unilateral liberalization with respect to all trading partners. Finally, the analysis in
this paper goes beyond traditional gains from trade by incorporating elements of \deep integration,"
which include increased inows of FDI into Honduras and potential productivity spillovers from
foreign-owned rms to the rest of the economy.
4 Honduras before DR-CAFTA
4.1 Social Accounting Matrix
The results of this paper are based on a 2004 social accounting matrix (SAM) for Honduras,
which was created specically for this exercise. The starting point for the detailed SAM is a
macro-economic SAM, constructed from the national accounts, public expenditure, and balance
of payment statistics.6 The results of compiling these data are shown in Table 1. The row and
column names denote, respectively, activities, commodities, factors, households, government, rest
of the world, taxes, import taris, and saving-investment.
In order to disaggregate the macro-SAM in Table 1 into a detailed social accounting matrix, we
draw on a number of data sources including a 1997 SAM for Honduras developed in Cuesta (2004),
a 2004 Honduran household survey,7 COMTRADE and TRAINS databases published by the UN,
and a Central America regional SAM from GTAP.8 The 1997 Honduras SAM includes 24 activities
and 24 commodities, of which 7 are in agriculture, 2 in natural resources, 6 in manufacturing, and 9
6These are obtained from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), Government Financial Statistics (GFS),
and Balance of Payments Yearbook.
72004 Encuesta de Hogares de Prop ositos M ultiples, or EPHPM, published by the Instituto Nacional de Estad stica
(http://www.ine-hn.org/).
8Documentation of the GTAP database is available on-line at http://www.gtap.org or in Dimaranan (2006).
4Table 1: Macroeconomic SAM, 2004 (billions of lempiras)
acts coms facts hhld govnt row tax tar invst total
acts 260.5 260.5
coms 137.2 116.0 16.7 57.3 35.6 362.8
facts 120.5 120.5
hhld 120.5 1.4 27.6 149.5
govnt 17.3 4.1 21.4
row 89.9 2.2 92.1
tax 2.8 8.3 6.3 17.4
tar 4.1 4.1
invst 25.1 3.3 7.2 35.6
total 260.5 362.8 120.5 149.6 21.4 92.1 17.3 4.1 35.6
Note: The SAM abbreviations stand for the following, from left to right and from top to
bottom: activities, commodities, factors, households, government, rest of the world, taxes,
import taris, and saving-investment. Row totals may dier from column totals due to
rounding.
Source: Author's calculations based on IFS, GFS, and BoP data.
in services. We maintain the sectoral disaggregation of Cuesta (2004) for activities/commodities in
agriculture, manufacturing, and natural resources (see Table 13 in the Appendix). Since a detailed
disaggregation of service sectors is not particularly relevant for the analysis of trade reform scenarios,
we aggregate the service sectors into four groups.
Total value added is split into labor and capital components using the shares from Cuesta
(2004), who estimates that payments to capital (combined with land, and natural resources) are
approximately 28 percent of total value added. Capital payments by sector are calculated in a
similar fashion, using the data from Cuesta (2004). In order to decompose labor value added by
skill level and sector of employment, we combine information from the 2004 EPHPM and Cuesta
(2004). We dene unskilled workers as those who completed less than a full cycle of secondary
school, skilled workers as having a high school diploma, and tertiary-skilled workers as those with
at least some education beyond secondary school. The distribution of labor income in EPHPM
across these three skill (education) categories as well as across four broad sectors|agriculture,
manufacturing, private services, and public services|is then used to decompose split labor value
added. Although the survey allows workers to report nine dierent sectors of employment, most of
the detail is in services, which receive a fairly aggregate treatment in our micro-SAM. Therefore, the
only source of the required information is Cuesta (2004), and we split the value added in agriculture,
manufacturing, and private services according to the shares calculated from his SAM. It was not
possible to use the Cuesta (2004) shares directly (i.e., without calculating the survey shares rst)
because doing so would make the SAM distribution of value added completely inconsistent with
the national accounts.
In order to disaggregate total imports and exports by trading partner and commodity, we use
the data from the UN COMTRADE database. For each trading partner, import and export data
were obtained at the 2-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classication) level and then
aggregated up to the level of detail of the micro-SAM. Rest-of-world values were obtained as the
dierence between exports and imports to all trading partners and those to the US, EU, and rest of
DR-CAFTA. Tari data were obtained from UN TRAINS as trade-weighted average taris at the
same 2-digit SITC level. Data were also collected on import taris in Honduras' trading partners;
5although these data are not part of the micro-SAM, they are essential for implementing the trade
reform scenarios in the following sections. Tari revenues were then aggregated at the commodity
level of detail of the micro-SAM, and the economy-wide average tari rate was not signicantly
dierent from the same rate calculated with balance of payments data. Due to data constraints,
international capital ows are not distinguished by region of origin.
The public sector is a relatively small part of the economy of Honduras. Government current
spending (including interest payments on outstanding debt) is 10 percent of domestic absorption,
while the public investment-to-absorption ratio is 4.3 percent.9 The public sector (excluding state-
owned enterprises) employs just over 7 percent of the total workforce and 34 percent of the total
stock of tertiary-skilled employees. We assume that in the nal demand stage, the government
consumes only its own commodity (public services). The government derives 29 percent of its
revenues from direct taxes, 52 percent from activity and sales taxes, and 19 percent from taxes on
international trade. The distribution of production (activity) and indirect (commodity) taxes is
obtained from Cuesta (2004). However, the value of sales taxes collected in the coee and banana
sectors had to be adjusted to avoid having tax rates in excess of 100 percent. In these cases, sales
tax rates were set to the economy-wide average for these sectors and the remainder allocated across
all other commodities in accordance to the share of total taxes paid by each commodity.
Ideally, the nal demand vector for households would be obtained from household survey data,
but the EPHPM does not contain a consumption module and it was not possible to obtain a copy of
the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH) which includes consumption
data. Instead, we use the consumption vector of Cuesta (2004), which is based on the 1998{99
ENIGH. On the income side, the representative household is the sole recipient of all labor income,
while capital income accrues to enterprises. 87 percent of these capital payments is remitted back to
the households, while the rest is spent on government bonds (6 percent) and transferred to foreign
owners of capital (7 percent). Households also receive transfers from abroad; these are mainly
workers' remittances, which amount to 78 percent of total current foreign private transfers.10
The only available source of demand for investment goods by sector for Honduras is Cuesta
(2004); however, the investment values reported in his SAM are not plausible since many sectors
report negative investment even after accounting for drawing down of inventories. Instead, we use
investment coecients from a 2001 GTAP SAM for Central America to split aggregate investment
according to the sectoral detail of the micro-SAM. Private investment is 84 percent nanced by
household saving, with the remainder coming from abroad. Foreign direct investment represents
83 percent of foreign capital inows destined for the private sector and 51 percent of total capital
inows from the rest of the world.
The data on intermediate consumption (input-output coecients) is obtained from Cuesta
(2004), who uses input-output coecients compiled by the Central Bank of Honduras. The Cuesta
(2004) coecients are used as an initial estimate for intermediate consumption; however, these
are adjusted at a later stage in order to satisfy the SAM balancing requirements. Because of
wide variations in the data sources, the initial SAM described in the above paragraphs is quite
unbalanced, although the imbalances are limited to the commodity rows and columns. In order to
balance the SAM, a cross-entropy estimation method was applied to minimize the distance from
9Absorption is dened as the sum of private and public consumption and investment. Interest payment ows
(on both domestic and foreign debt) are not shown directly, but instead are netted out of the other transfers (e.g.,
government transfers to enterprises and households are net of non-tax payments to the government and domestic
interest payments).
10The importance of remittances from Hondurans working abroad has risen steadily over time, increasing to 10
percent of GNI in 2004 from a 4 percent average in the 1990s.
6initial to nal input-output coecients while ensuring that row and column totals sum up to the
same value.11 The nal SAM is not shown here to conserve space, but is available from the author
upon request.
The SAM captures only ow information about the economy and does not contain any data
on stocks. Three types of stocks are particularly relevant for the CGE model in this paper: labor,
capital, and debt. Information on labor volumes is obtained from the EPHPM survey; this is
discussed in more detail in section 4.2 below. The ratio of total capital stock to GDP (a factor of
2.25) is obtained from Cuesta (2001), who cites various Honduras Central Bank (Banco Central de
Honduras) bulletins as his source. Sectoral capital stocks are then derived by assuming that the
rate of return to capital is the same in all activities. Public debt stocks are very high at 59 and 26
percent of GDP for foreign and domestic components, respectively, although the debt situation has
improved somewhat since the 1980s, when total debt was well above 80 percent of GNI and debt
service payments amounted to approximately one-third of total exports. Private external debt is
negligible and is not considered in this analysis.12
4.2 Labor volumes and labor market segmentation
In order to obtain data on labor volumes and wages, we return to the EPHPM. Using this survey
data, we calculate the number of workers (both wage workers and self-employed) in four aggregate
sectors|agriculture, manufacturing, private services, and public services|in the three relevant skill
levels. Since we used the survey data to decompose aggregate labor value added, the survey wage
levels are close to the results we obtain when dividing the SAM value added by the above labor
volumes. We assume that average wages at a more disaggregated level (i.e., within agriculture,
manufacturing, and private services) are equal to average wages for the aggregate sector. For
example, average wages in bananas, sugar, coee, livestock, etc., are the same as the average wages
for agriculture as a whole. It is likely that imposing this homogeneity assumption is overly strict, but
this is the simplest and clearest way of calculating labor volumes without access to additional data.
Furthermore, this simplication has potentially important modeling benets. Most CGE models,
including the one used in this paper (see section 5 for more detailed model description), do not
contain the theoretical structure necessary to explain sectoral wage dierentials, and usually treat
them as xed wage premiums. As a result, any degree of labor mobility across sectors generates
instant productivity gains when a worker moves to an occupation with a higher wage. This may
be reasonable when a worker switches from farming to manufacturing or services, but is probably
implausible when switching from growing bananas to coee. Therefore, if one wishes to consider
longer-term scenarios in which labor is likely to be mobile, it is best to keep inter-sectoral wage
dierentials to a minimum.
The survey data show that the disparities between farm and non-farm wages at the same skill
level are very large: an average farm worker can expect to earn about six times more if he or
she switches employment to a non-agricultural sector. These large earnings dierentials point to
signicant barriers to labor mobility and overall low labor market exibility in Honduras. In order
11See Robinson et al. (1998) and Robinson and El-Said (2000). The approach is analogous to Bayesian estimation,
and uses an optimization routine to minimize the discrepancies between the original unbalanced matrix A and the
unknown balanced matrix A
 subject to prior knowledge of certain elements of the A
 matrix. For the Honduras
SAM, the adjustment factors (ratio between nal and original coecients) range from 0.10 to 9.53. The average
adjustment factor is 1.84.
12See, for example, International Monetary Fund (2006), which seems to use the terms \external debt" and \external
public debt" interchangeably.
7to determine whether these wage premia represent barriers to movement or are reective of other
worker characteristics (such as dierences in average education levels, experience, etc., for workers
in dierent sectors), we estimate a set of Mincer equations for wage workers and the self-employed
(Table 2). For the former, the dependent variable is the log of monthly labor income, while for
the latter, the dependent variable is the log of all earned income (i.e., excluding transfers) due to
the diculties of separating the labor and non-labor earnings components of the self-employed (as
discussed earlier). The independent variables include a set of education dummies that range from
incomplete primary school (dedu2) to some tertiary education (dedu6), as explained in the note to
Table 2. Experience (exp) is approximated by the dierence between the worker's age and his or
her years of schooling, and the regression includes a quadratic term (exp2) to capture decreasing
returns to experience. Finally, in addition to gender (dfem) and urban (durb) dummies, the vector
of independent variables includes a set of sectoral dummies (dsec2   dsec9) to capture potential
earnings dierentials (wage premiums) by sector of employment (also dened in the note to Table
2).
The estimates of Table 2 are in line with our expectations. Attaining progressively higher
education levels results in signicant and accelerating increases in earnings, although there do
not appear to be any income benets from completing less than a full cycle of primary school as
compared with no formal education whatsoever. Males and urban dwellers tend to earn more than
females and rural workers, controlling for other factors, and the returns to experience diminish at
the margin. Incomes in manufacturing and services are signicantly above earnings in agriculture
and sheries (the reference sector), although the dierences appear less pronounced for the self-
employed. In other words, even after controlling for education, experience, gender, and urban
premiums, the analysis in Table 2 reveals signicant earnings dierentials across sectors.
4.3 Structure of protection
Previous discussion has pointed out that Honduras is already a very open economy and has a low
level of external protection. The average tari rate is only 6.11 percent and tari dispersion is
not very large, as shown in Table 3, which summarizes the distribution of taris and imports by
commodity and trading partner. There are four main messages conveyed by this table. First, there
is a clear bias in protection in favor of agricultural commodities across all trading partners. The
second message is that taris on trade with other DR-CAFTA members tend to be higher than
taris faced by the exporters from the US, the EU, and the rest of the world. Third, imports of
agricultural products are relatively small; the share of agriculture in total merchandise imports is
13 percent. Table 3 also shows that the US is a very important source of imports for Honduras,
accounting for 40 percent of total imports. Finally, there does not appear to be a sectoral bias
in the composition of US imports, since the US shares of Honduran imports of agricultural and
manufactured goods are roughly the same as for total imports.
The fact that 42 percent of Honduran agriculture imports come from the United States, com-
bined with a relatively high level of protection of farm products (compared to other products),
implies that the opening of these markets could result in negative income shocks for agricultural
producers and may have adverse consequences for poverty in the absence of compensatory poli-
cies. At the same time, these eects could possibly be mitigated if the producers are able to take
advantage of lower prices of intermediate goods through substitution toward imports. However,
consumers of agricultural products would have the opportunity to take advantage of lower food
prices, which is likely to be particularly benecial to the urban poor.
Taris on US imports represent 33 percent of total tari revenue and 7 percent of total income
8Table 2: Labor Market Segmentation Estimation Results
Wage workers Self-employed
Variable Coecient Std. Err. Coecient Std. Err.
dedu2 0.274 0.197 0.978 0.640
dedu3 0.563 0.197 1.250y 0.640
dedu4 0.641 0.200 1.429 0.643
dedu5 0.807 0.201 1.381 0.646
dedu6 1.417 0.198 1.999 0.642
exp 0.052 0.004 0.054 0.006
exp2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
dfem -0.189 0.022 -0.714 0.049
durb 0.246 0.026 0.488 0.048
dsec2 0.941 0.216 0.233 0.501
dsec3 0.690 0.043 0.229y 0.126
dsec4 0.780 0.103 1.676 0.353
dsec5 0.427 0.055 0.708 0.125
dsec6 0.540 0.045 0.691 0.121
dsec7 0.778 0.062 0.719 0.145
dsec8 0.653 0.052 0.905 0.178
dsec9 0.490 0.045 -0.095 0.144
N 5782 N 2696
R2 0.417 R2 0.349
F (17;5764) 196.477 F (17;2678) 87.385
Signicance levels : y 10%  5%  1%
Note: Observations are weighted by sample weights, and robust standard errors are
reported. Education dummies (dedu2 to dedu6) are dened as follows: less than com-
plete primary, complete primary, less than complete secondary, complete secondary,
more than secondary. No formal education is the reference dummy. Sector dummies
(dsec2 to dsec9) are dened as follows: mining, manufacturing, water, electricity, gas,
construction, commerce and hotels, transport and communications, nancial services,
public and social services. Agriculture and sheries is the reference sector.
Source: Author's calculations using data from 2004 EPHPM.
of the government. Therefore, there are important revenue considerations related to tari liberal-
ization vis- a-vis the US, as the government will need to either signicantly curtail its spending, nd
other sources of income to make up for the budgetary shortfall, or else borrow more and increase
its debt. The choice of instruments to close the nancing gap has important implications for the
outcome of the reform (or model simulations). Higher indirect taxes tend to disproportionately
aect the poorer households and are usually more dicult to collect, while raising direct taxes
can lead to undesirable consequences such as income under-reporting or even reduced remittance
inows. Decreasing public spending could jeopardize important social programs, while taking on
additional debt could threaten long-term solvency and macro stability. Whatever the mechanism,
however, some of the gains in consumer surplus will be eroded if the implementation of tari reform
is revenue-neutral.
The average tari rate faced by Honduran exporters on the global markets is 8.4 percent, but
9Table 3: Honduran Import Taris and Import Values, 2004 (Percent and Millions of Lempiras)
CACM and DR EU US RoW
Sector  M  M  M  M
Bananas 15.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 15.0 0.7 15.0 0.0
Coee 15.0 1.1 14.3 0.0 15.0 4.0 15.0 9.6
Sugar 14.8 5.5 4.2 4.9 5.5 50.2 4.4 5.9
Mining 0.0 0.4 5 0.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.3
Livestock 8.4 240.1 5.0 0.0 0.2 35.0 1.1 22.6
Wood 6.8 91.1 9.9 313.9 9.6 48.1 10.0 52.1
Non-traditional crops 10.1 1673.3 8.2 113.0 10.5 950.6 11.2 741.1
Domestic crops 14.3 1226.2 4.6 167.4 6.2 2588.5 7.3 428.9
Oil 2.3 57.6 4.2 196.3 4.7 5691.9 4.8 4673.8
Food, beverages, tobacco 13.8 818.3 11.1 147.7 11.7 1073.2 11.2 668.9
Textiles 11.8 400.3 13.1 93.0 10.8 886.6 12.4 1156.1
Paper 10.7 1011.5 1.8 129.8 3.5 1507.6 5.9 463.5
Chemicals 4.7 1308.3 2.8 506.9 2.3 2316.4 3.7 1418.2
Metals, minerals, mach. 8.8 2510.3 1.8 2527.8 2.2 7626.7 3.7 6395.9
Other manufacturing 8.6 2667.4 4.9 1262.7 7.4 4307.1 7.7 7108.2
Merchandise trade 9.6 12014.8 3.8 5463.6 5.0 27088.6 6.1 23145.0
Agriculture 11.5 3240.8 8.1 599.2 7.3 3677.0 9.6 1260.2
Manufacturing 8.9 8774.0 3.3 4864.3 4.6 23411.6 5.9 21884.8
Note: For each trading partner, the rst column () contains the ad-valorem tari rates collected by
the Honduran authorities and the second column (M) contains total imports for each commodity. All
taris are import-weighted. \RoW" stands for rest of the world,i.e., all trading partners other than
CACM countries and the Dominican Republic, the EU, and the US. The manufacturing aggregate
includes oil and mining.
Source: Author's calculations using data from UN COMTRADE and UN TRAINS.
the structure of this foreign protection is radically dierent across the country's export markets.
Table 4 shows the distribution of taris and export values by commodity and destination. These
data illustrate three main points. First, Honduras has virtually tari-free access to the EU and the
US, which account for 58 percent of its total merchandise exports.13 Second, Honduran exports
are heavily biased toward agricultural products, which comprise 59 percent of all goods exports.
Third, its trade with other DR-CAFTA members is intensive in manufactured goods, but is also
subject to relatively high protection.
Together, Table 3 and Table 4 show that the direct benets of liberalizing trade with the United
States as part of the DR-CAFTA accession are likely to be fairly limited. Pursuing additional
liberalization with other DR-CAFTA partners is likely to have larger eect on welfare in Honduras,
but only if the country is able to successfully negotiate improved access for its manufactured
exports. At the same time, further integration with the rest of DR-CAFTA countries will likely
involve lowering Honduras' own sizable tari barriers against these partners, and making up for
lost tari revenue could put additional strain on the public budget.
13The only exceptions to this are the EU banana tari and the US textile tari, but exports of these goods are
only 7.6 and 6.3 percent of total exports to each destination.
10Table 4: Foreign Taris on Honduran Exports and Honduran Export Values, 2004 (Percent and
Millions of Lempiras)
CACM and DR EU US RoW
Sector x X x X x X x X
Bananas 0.0 36.8 6.3 398.8 0.0 2884.8 12.2 9.1
Coee 0.0 72.5 0.0 3718.6 0 650.1 0.1 964.3
Sugar 0.0 26.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 313.9 9.3 97.5
Mining 0.0 61.3 0.0 183.3 0.0 994.7 4.0 386.9
Livestock 0.0 12 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.5 0.7 7.0
Wood 5.5 147.2 0.0 112.3 0.0 687.4 2.3 856.4
Non-traditional crops 0.0 1339.7 1.1 564.3 0.0 3251.4 4.0 82.7
Domestic crops 11.1 338.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 8.6 11.8 30.6
Oil 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Food, beverages, tobacco 4.7 1414.0 0.0 23.8 5.0 595.3 12.1 1039.2
Textiles 0.3 384.9 0.0 16.7 11.6 708.2 17.1 57.1
Paper 11.5 401.8 0.0 3.7 0.0 57.1 14.7 143.0
Chemicals 2.6 448.7 0.0 14.8 0.0 109.8 14.0 92.4
Metals, minerals, mach. 15.0 1158.1 0.0 159.6 0.0 500.6 6.1 320.7
Other manufacturing 0.9 1678.0 0.0 53.2 0.0 432.7 7.4 184
Merchandise trade 4.8 7519.4 0.6 5250.6 1.0 11198.3 6.0 4270.9
Agriculture 2.3 1972.5 0.7 4795.3 0.0 7799.7 2.6 2047.5
Manufacturing 5.7 5546.9 0.0 455.2 3.3 3398.6 9.1 2223.3
Note: For each trading partner, the rst column (x) contains the ad-valorem tari rates collected
by that trading partner on Honduran exports and the second column (X) contains total exports for
each commodity. \RoW" stands for rest of the world, i.e., all trading partners other than CACM
countries and the Dominican Republic, the EU, and the US. The manufacturing aggregate includes oil
and mining.
Source: Author's calculations using data from UN COMTRADE and UN TRAINS.
4.4 Structure of production and demand
The economy of Honduras is dominated by service sectors, which account for 72 percent of GDP
at factor cost and 49 percent of total production.14 The rst column of Table 5 provides additional
detail on the structure of production by sector. Agriculture is dominated by domestic crops, followed
by non-traditional crops (e.g., melons, sweet peppers, chiles, tilapia, shrimp) and livestock. Food,
beverages, tobacco, and textiles account for slightly less than two-thirds of total value added and
production in manufacturing.
The second and third columns of Table 5 show the export orientation and import dependence
of each sector. With the possible exception of food, beverages, and tobacco, all other sectors
appear to have a clear orientation toward either exports or imports, conrming that the sectoral
disaggregation of the model is suciently detailed. There is a clear bias toward exports in most
farm activities, with coee and bananas selling virtually all of their output abroad, which makes
these sectors vulnerable to global demand shocks and commodity price uctuations. With the
exception of metals, minerals, and machinery (a small sector), export shares in manufacturing are
14The dierence between the two numbers is that the former does not include demand for intermediate inputs
while the latter does, i.e., the distinction is between value added and value added plus intermediates.
11all below 20 percent. Honduras exports only 7 percent of total output in the textiles sector, and 10
percent of the total production of food, beverages, and tobacco. Recall that the previous section
identied these sectors as the only ones facing signicant trade barriers in the US market, which
implies that it would be dicult for Honduras to take full advantage of higher export prices in the
US without signicant changes in its export intensities.
Table 5: Sectoral Composition of Production, Exports, and Imports, 2004 (Percent)
Sector Share in Exports to Imports Share of total value added
total pro- total pro- to total Unsk. Skil. Ter. Cap.+
duction duction demand labor labor labor land
Bananas 1.3 95.0 2.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 98.7
Coee 2.1 98 11.6 25.3 0.1 0.8 73.8
Sugar 1.2 14.5 2.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 99.5
Mining 1.1 56.4 0.2 3.9 2.9 3.4 89.9
Livestock 4.2 0.2 2.7 25.8 0.0 1 73.2
Wood 0.9 76.9 48.3 0.2 0.0 3.1 96.6
Non-traditional crops 4.6 43.8 34.1 10.1 0.7 9.1 80.1
Domestic crops 6.9 2.1 19.9 68.2 7.8 5.2 18.7
Oil 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Food, beverages, tobacco 11.6 10.2 9.1 71.2 9.8 0.1 18.9
Textiles 6.4 7.0 14.1 0.6 76.0 12.7 10.6
Paper 2.1 11.2 39.2 76.8 0.9 0.1 22.1
Chemicals 2.5 10.4 49.2 0.8 0.4 68.4 30.4
Metals, minerals, mach. 1.4 59.6 92.9 0.7 1.9 47 50.3
Other manufacturing 4.6 19.5 61.3 0.5 64.2 21.6 13.7
Electricity, water, gas 1.3 1.5 11.5 0.3 0.1 0.8 98.8
Construction 6.3 0.0 3.0 43.8 20.0 10.7 25.5
Other services 35.1 31.8 25.4 30.0 25.0 18.7 26.4
Public sector 12.8 0.0 0.0 34.6 23.1 42.4 0.0
Total 100.0 44.0 30.7 34.8 22.3 17.9 25.1
Agriculture 21.2 60.1 18.5 42.3 4.5 6.1 47.2
Manufacturing 29.6 30.1 47.3 42.2 26.3 12.0 19.5
Services 42.7 52.3 21.3 31.9 23.6 20.9 23.6
Note: The manufacturing aggregate includes oil and mining. Total production includes production for
domestic consumption and exports. Total demand includes demand for domestically produced goods
and imports.
Source: Author's calculations using data from the SAM.
Import dependence is under one-third of total demand for the economy overall, and is signi-
cantly lower in the farm sector. The earlier section highlighted the potential vulnerability of farmers
to trade liberalization under DR-CAFTA since Honduras sources a large share of its agricultural
imports from the US. However, Table 5 shows that, with the exception of wood and non-traditional
crops, most farm activities are under moderate competitive pressure from imports.15 One reason
for the low penetration of foreign-produced farm goods is the relatively higher protection aorded
15The import dependence of the wood sector is close to one-half of total demand, but its share in total output is
very small relative to other agricultural activities. Although the import dependence of domestic crops is not large
relative to the economy-wide average, import dependence of one-fth is not small in absolute terms. For example, it
12to agriculture in Honduras; however, since taris are not prohibitive, it is unlikely to be the only
reason. Thus, the relatively low import dependence is likely to limit the extent of negative income
shocks for farmers|although some groups of agriculture producers, such as domestic crop farmers,
could be aected more than others (e.g., large scale coee and banana producers).
Import dependence is much higher in manufacturing sectors, particularly for metals, miner-
als, machinery, and other manufacturing. Since 37 percent of Honduran manufacturing imports
(excluding oil and mining) come from the United States, trade liberalization under DR-CAFTA is
likely to have signicant eects on prices of manufactured goods and could hurt domestic producers.
At the same time, these activities source a large share of their intermediate inputs from each other
or from imports (the share of intermediate inputs in total production of manufactures, excluding oil
and mining, is 70 percent), and therefore lower input prices will work to oset the adverse eects
of lower output prices for producers.
The last four columns of Table 5 show the composition of value added for each sector. Overall,
there does not appear to be an obvious relationship between export orientation and import depen-
dence on the one hand, and unskilled and skilled labor intensities on the other. Therefore, it is
dicult to anticipate beforehand the likely eects of trade liberalization on factor returns. Note
that the contribution of capital and land to total value added is very high in a number of farm
activities, and somewhat low in several manufacturing sectors. One of the reasons for this is that
SAM estimates of capital and labor shares in total value added sometimes contain sectoral biases
(see, for example, Harrison et al., 2003). For instance, agricultural activities may exhibit a high
share of capital in total value added because self-employed income may be classied as returns to
capital. On the other hand, some manufacturing activities may show low capital shares due to low
protability.
5 Model Description
The CGE model used in this paper is the World Bank's prototype single-country model.16 Pro-
duction takes place under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, and is modeled in a
nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) fashion to reect various substitution possibilities
across inputs (see Figure 1). In the top nest, sectoral output (XP) is produced as a CES combi-
nation of intermediate products (ND) and value added (V A). The elasticity of substitution may
be set to zero, yielding the usual xed-coecients top-level output structure. The second, third,
and fourth nests decompose intermediate inputs and value added into their respective components.
Total intermediate demand is split into intermediate demand by commodity (XAp), which is then
decomposed into domestic (XD) and imported (XM) inputs. Total value added is composed of
a capital-labor bundle (KL), which in turn consists of a combination of unskilled labor (UL) and
capital and skilled labor (KSK). The unskilled labor bundle is composed of workers who com-
pleted no more than a secondary level of education, while the capital-skilled labor bundle contains
aggregate capital (KT) and tertiary-skilled workers (SKL). This nesting structure allows highly
skilled workers to be complements to capital. At the bottom level of the value added production
nests, factor demands (Ld and Kd) are functions of wages and rental rates, which can be both type-
(i.e., skilled and unskilled labor) and sector-specic.
is roughly similar to the import dependence of US steel industry, where imports seem to have quite an impact. In
addition, this sector is large and sources a large share of its imports from the US.
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Figure 1: Nested Structure of Production
Source: van der Mensbrugghe (2005c).
Produced goods are transformed into consumed goods by means of a transition matrix, which
has a simple one-to-one mapping due to data limitations. The household demand structure is
determined according to the linear expenditure system (LES), in which consumers maximize Stone-
Geary utility functions subject to the disposable income constraint.17 Other nal demand agents|
government and investment|use the CES expenditure system. Import demand is modeled using
the nested Armington specication, in which consumer products are dierentiated by region of
origin and combined using CES functions.18 On the supply side, producers allocate output to
domestic and export markets the model according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
specication. World prices are exogenous, which means that any increase in import demand or
export supply can be satised without aecting global prices (small country assumption).19
The aggregate stock of capital is allocated across sectors in a CET fashion, with capital being
17See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Chapter 3) for a detailed discussion of the LES demand system, and Stone
(1954) for the Stone-Geary utility function.
18See Armington (1969).
19The export elasticity in the sugar sector is nite to reect the US sugar quota.
14freely mobile across all sectors. Tertiary-skilled labor is also fully mobile. In contrast, markets
for low- and medium-skilled labor are segmented into farm- and non-farm categories. Within each
segment, labor is perfectly mobile across activities (e.g., from bananas to coee in agriculture),
but mobility across segments is limited by a nite inter-segment migration elasticity.20 The initial
level of migration is set at 1 percent of the farm sector labor force, a level broadly consistent with
the historical rates of rural-to-urban migration in Honduras reported in WDI for the period 1974{
2004. Although international migration is likely to be an important element in the dynamics of the
Honduran labor market, it is not considered in this analysis due to the diculties of modeling this
ow in a single-country setting.
The version of the model used in this paper assumes no change in the degree of resource
utilization, or xed employment. On the one hand, this assumption is reasonable given that the
ocial unemployment rate in Honduras has been uctuating around four percent over the last ve
years. On the other hand, unocial estimates place the unemployment rate as high as 28 percent,
in which case the assumption of the unchanging unemployment rate could be more controversial.
However, real wages in Honduras have been stable over the same period (Gindling and Terrell, 2006),
which provides indirect evidence of signicant labor market rigidities. In this case, unless we expect
signicant institutional improvements that make the Honduran labor market more competitive (not
very likely given the historical performance of the economy, particularly in the business-as-usual
scenario), the xed unemployment rate assumption seems appropriate.
The volumes of government current and investment spending are xed as shares of real GDP,
while the decit (in real terms) is also xed. Public revenues adjust to clear the government balance
by means of a exible household direct tax rate. The shortfall between government investment
demand and public saving is satised by a combination of domestic and foreign borrowing: domestic
borrowing is a xed share of the dierence between public investment and public saving, while
foreign borrowing makes up the residual. The total amount of foreign borrowing is limited by the
restriction that foreign debt must remain a constant share of GDP throughout the model horizon, a
restriction which implies that increases in foreign borrowing by the public sector crowd out private
borrowing and private investment. Changes in the private capital stock are determined by the
available quantity of private investment. Foreign direct investment, representing the majority of
private capital ows from abroad, is exogenous and xed as a share of real GDP. The investment-to-
GDP ratio is xed at the base year value and a exible marginal propensity to save out of household
disposable income ensures that total saving equals total investment. The current account balance is
xed by the available quantity of foreign saving, and a exible real exchange rate clears the balance
of payments constraint.21 The price of absorption is set as the num eraire.
The model is solved in a recursive dynamic mode, in which a sequence of end-of-period equi-
libria are linked with a set of equations that update the main macro variables. There are three
determinants of real GDP growth in the model: labor supply growth, capital accumulation, and
increases in productivity. The volumes of all three types of labor grow exogenously at the rate of
growth of the working age population (ages 15-64), obtained from World Bank population fore-
casts.22 The capital stock in each period is the sum of depreciated capital from the period before
20Note that the migration function is only specied in one direction and the level of migration is bounded from
below by zero. In other words, no worker would migrate from non-farm to farm activities even if the agricultural
wage surpassed the non-agricultural one.
21The balance of payments equation is redundant due to Walras's Law and is dropped from the model specication.
22Note that this assumption ignores the recent eorts by the government of Honduras to scale up resources toward
achieving the Millennium Development Goals, particularly the education target of reaching universal completion of
primary school by 2015. Since almost 45 percent of the total population of Honduras is 16 years old or younger,
15and new investment, which is a xed ratio of real GDP in the previous period.
The behavior of the third component|productivity|is factor- and sector-specic. Labor and
capital productivity in agriculture grow exogenously at one percent per year, broadly consistent
with the econometric literature on productivity growth in low income countries.23 For all other
sectors, capital productivity remains xed throughout the model horizon, while growth in labor
productivity (which is assumed to be Harrod-neutral, purely labor-augmenting technical change)
can be exogenous or endogenous depending on the type of simulation. The evolution of skill- and
sector-specic labor productivity L










In the baseline scenario, also referred to as Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario, L
t is endogenous
while real GDP growth is xed. This allows the user to calibrate the model to any given GDP
growth rate. In scenarios other than BaU, L
t is xed in each period at the BaU solution level,
and GDP growth becomes endogenous. Thus, in the absence of any shocks, the BaU GDP growth
rate is reproduced exactly. In policy simulations, real GDP growth may dier from BaU due to
faster/slower accumulation of labor or capital, or shocks to the sector-specic productivity shift
parameters for labor, capital, or land (L
l;i;K
k;i;T
t;i). In other words, variations in GDP growth
across scenarios can be directly attributed to the simulated policy reforms, allowing for clear welfare
comparisons.
The elasticity values used in this paper come from the World Bank's global LINKAGE model
(van der Mensbrugghe, 2005b). The substitution (Armington) and transformation (CET) elastici-
ties are \middle of the road" values in the range of elasticities used in the recent CGE literature.
Many econometrically estimated Armington elasticities tend to be quite low, often below one, while
the estimated CET elasticities are usually several times greater than the corresponding Armingtons
(Annabi et al., 2006). Many of the CGE studies published by the International Food Policy Re-
search Institute (see, for example, Lofgren, 2001) also use fairly low Armington elasticities, ranging
between 0.2 and 2.4, while their CET elasticities tend to be around 1.5. On the other hand, studies
such as Harrison et al. (2001) often use Armington (CES) elasticities of 15 at the top level and
as high as 30 at the bottom. Armington elasticities in the GTAP model, which are both econo-
metrically estimated and drawn from literature surveys, are on average 3.5 for the top nest and
7.0 for the bottom (Dimaranan, 2006). However, users of the GTAP model have often used higher
elasticities; for example, Hertel et al. (1996) double the default Armington (CES) elasticities in
their evaluation of the consequences of the Uruguay Round. The LINKAGE elasticities, which are
on average 19 percent higher than the default GTAP elasticities, thus appear to be a reasonable
compromise between the extremely high and low values.
signicant progress toward this goal is bound to have large distributional and temporal eects on the labor force: as
enrollment, completion, and continuation to the next education cycle rates rise, the relative share of unskilled labor
would decline in favor of more skilled categories. Furthermore, increasingly larger parts of the labor force would leave
the labor market (to go to school) and return after having completed their education. We ignore these possibilities
for the sake of simplicity and to keep the discussion focused on trade liberalization and its immediate consequences.
See Bussolo and Medvedev (2006) for a more detailed exposition.
23For example, Martin and Mitra (1999) estimate that total factor productivity in agriculture grows at an annual
rate of 1.44 to 1.99 percent in low income countries.
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6.1 Description of simulations
In order to assess the potential eects of DR-CAFTA accession for Honduras, this section contrasts
a Business-as-Usual scenario with ve alternative simulations that highlight dierent aspects of
trade liberalization under DR-CAFTA, while the next section will focus on the potential eects of
increased FDI inows into Honduras. The following paragraphs review the main features of each
of the scenarios, starting with the BaU. To keep the discussion focused, the text will concentrate
on major dierences across scenarios; features that are not specically mentioned remain the same
in all scenarios as in the BaU.
Business-as-Usual (BaU). The BaU simulation denes a backdrop against which other sce-
narios will be compared by establishing a baseline growth path from 2004 through 2016. Under
BaU conditions, real GDP per capita grows at an average rate of 2.2 percent per year. This is
consistent with the IMF, World Bank, and government of Honduras growth projections (see, for
example, International Monetary Fund, 2006), but much faster than the 0.5 percent average annual
growth recorded over the 1990{2004 period.24 Most macroeconomic variables, including foreign re-
mittances, public spending, private investment, FDI, public investment, and external debt, remain
a xed share of real GDP through the model horizon (i.e., they grow at the same rate as real GDP).
Bilateral CAFTA with the US (CBL). The CBL simulation envisages a gradual removal of
tari barriers between the USA and Honduras over the 2004{2016 period. Although in principle
DR-CAFTA is a regional agreement rather than a hub-and-spoke arrangement, this simulation
models the agreement's implementation as a bilateral deal for two reasons. First, this choice
facilitates comparison with other studies of DR-CAFTA, all of which have modeled it as a bilateral
arrangement. Second, since DR-CAFTA preferences gradually replace those available under the
CBI as Central American countries join the treaty, the agreement is identical to a hub-and-spoke
arrangement until all member countries ratify it. Therefore, this scenario models DR-CAFTA as
a bilateral agreement, while the implications of the accession of all other parties to the agreement
will be explored in a subsequent simulation.
Given the limited level of sectoral detail in the model, it is impossible to reproduce the imple-
mentation of DR-CAFTA tari provisions exactly. Instead, this simulation imposes a pattern of
liberalization that is roughly similar to the main provisions of the agreement. In order to change
the tari structure of Honduras' trading partners, this paper uses the protection data of Table 4 to
shock the partner-specic vector of world export prices|in this case, that of the US. Since most
of the US trade barriers are to be eliminated immediately, this simulation increases the US export
prices by the full amount starting in 2007. This is clearly an optimistic scenario, especially because
several US import quotas (which are not explicitly modeled in this analysis) will be relaxed but not
fully eliminated.25 Nonetheless, it is useful to consider it as a \best-case" possibility. Honduras'
24Between 1990 and 2004, real GDP growth averaged 3.3 percent|just slightly faster than the growth rate of
population|and consumption per capita has been virtually stagnant.
25To take account of the sugar quota, the model imposes a nite export elasticity on the exports of sugar to the
US. In the case of a nite elasticity, the producers' decision to export more drives down the world price and leads to
lower export demand. The result is that the value of Honduran sugar exports to the US in BaU increases by only
three percent between 2004 and 2016. Currently, Honduran sugar quota is 9.6 tons, which expands immediately to
17.6 tons following the implementation of DR-CAFTA and eventually (in year 15 of the agreement) to 10.2 tons.
However, the US reserves the right to keep the sugar quota at its original pre-CAFTA level and instead compensate
Honduras unilaterally. The complicated and restrictive language of sugar quota provisions has led Francois et al.
(2005) to conclude that \the trade agreement will produce no substantial changes in current bilateral trade conditions
17own taris versus the United States are lowered according to the following schedule: taris on agri-
cultural imports are gradually reduced by two-thirds between 2007 and 2016, while manufacturing
taris are cut by 80 percent in 2007 and gradually brought to zero over the remaining period.
To further decompose the eects of CAFTA into the consequences of removal of own pro-
tection and rising export prices, we implement two additional simulations. The rst one, CHN,
reduces Honduran import taris according to the schedule in the previous paragraph without any
modications to the export prices. The second one, CUS, changes the US export prices while leav-
ing protection in Honduras unchanged. Neither of these scenarios are meant to represent policy
simulations|they are included only as a decomposition exercise to illustrate the relative contribu-
tions of removal of protection by Honduras and the United States to the total eect of the CAFTA
simulation.
Bilateral CAFTA with the US with high Armington income elasticities (Chi
BL). The setup of
this simulation is virtually identical to the CBL scenario above, with one important dierence in
modeling import demand. In the standard version of the model, domestic goods and imports are
aggregated into an Armington composite with a CES function. This implies that a 1 percent change
in demand for the Armington composite will change demand for both domestic and imported
goods by 1 percent: i.e., the \income" elasticity is equal to unity. This assumption simplies
the calibration procedure (because no additional parameter estimates are required beyond the
Armington elasticity), but may not be very realistic. In order to allow the income elasticity of
imports to rise following trade liberalization, we modify the Armington aggregation function by
adding Stone-Geary-type shift parameters (\minimum consumption requirements"). The resulting
domestic and import demand functions (derived in Appendix A) resemble demand equations in an
LES system, and collapse to the original CES specication if both shift parameters are set to zero.
To simplify calibration, the model sets the domestic shift parameter to zero (therefore assuming
that the domestic income elasticity is unity) and uses the import income elasticity and the import
demand equation to calibrate the import shift parameter.26 In the current version, both shift
parameters remain xed throughout the model horizon, although it is possible to allow the income
elasticity to grow over time by recalibrating the import shift parameter after each solution period.
Multilateral CAFTA (CML). This simulation is identical in virtually every aspect to the CBL
scenario described above, with the exception that tari reductions are phased in with respect to all
members of DR-CAFTA (i.e., including the CACM countries and the Dominican Republic) rather
than with respect to the US alone.
Full multilateral liberalization (FL). This is a reference simulation in which trade between
Honduras and all of its trading partners is fully liberalized. On the imports side, Honduran taris
on all products are eliminated in ten equal steps between 2007 and 2016. At the same time,
Honduran export prices gradually rise by the full amount of taris levied on these exports in
2004. It is important to note that this simulation is not meant to reect any specic trade policy
outcome (e.g., the conclusion and implementation of the Doha Development Round) but is instead
a benchmark scenario that allows us to appreciate how close DR-CAFTA gets Honduras to a
pure free trade scenario. Or, put another way, this simulation allows us to assess whether the
pattern of sectoral adjustment (and therefore revealed comparative advantage) under DR-CAFTA
is consistent with Honduras' comparative advantage on the global market.
in this sector." Therefore, due to uncertainties regarding the implementation of the quota expansion, we keep the
world price of sugar constant in all simulations, eectively leaving the quota unchanged.
26The import income elasticity is set to 1.2. See Appendix A for calibration details.
186.2 Macroeconomic results
We begin the discussion of simulation results by focusing on macroeconomic variables. Table 6
shows the evolution of GDP and its components, exchange rate, welfare, and some key ratios for
each of the simulations described in the previous paragraph. Real GDP at market prices grows at
an average annual rate of 4.17 percent, and investment and public consumption follow the same
path. Changes in relative prices explain why the \nominal" GDP grows at a slightly faster rate.
Export growth lags behind the growth of imports while the real exchange rate appreciates slightly
(by 0.64 percent over the entire period).27 There are several reasons why private consumption is
growing slower than real GDP. Since the income elasticity of demand is higher for services than for
agriculture and manufactured goods, consumer preferences (both in terms of domestically produced
goods and imports) shift to services over time. However, as the share of services in total imports
rises, the government collects less tari revenues since there are no taris on services. In addition,
since production taxes are levied only on manufactured goods and sales tax rates are generally
higher for industrial and agricultural products than services, the share of these items in the scal
budget declines over time. Since the real level of government expenditure grows at the same rate
as real GDP, household taxes must rise to maintain a xed scal decit.28 Although the increase
in the tax rate is not very large (it rises from 4.28 to 4.83 percent), it is enough to slow the growth
in disposable income by 0.15 percentage points per year.
The CBL column shows the growth rates in GDP and its components attained under the CAFTA
simulation described in the previous section. By 2016, the economy-wide average tari declines to
3.51 percent (from 6.07 percent in BaU), and the exports price index increases from 99.25 to 100.08.
As a result, both import and export growth accelerate signicantly relative to the BaU scenario,
and the trade-to-GDP ratio in the nal year rises by more than 5 percentage points. The increase
in import ows is due entirely to the re-orientation of trade toward the US. The volume of imports
from the US rises by 30.4 percent relative to BaU while the volume of imports from all other
destinations falls by 33.9 percent. In nominal terms, the 2016 US-sourced imports rise by 12,514
million lempiras while imports from other trading partners fall by 7,696 million lempiras, indicating
that trade creation outweighs trade diversion. On the other hand, due to the increasing orientation
of the Honduran economy toward the external sector, export volumes rise across the board: exports
destined to the United States increase by 18.5 percent relative to the BaU simulation, while exports
to all other destinations rise by 29.1 percent, albeit from a much smaller base.29
Other macro variables remain virtually unchanged relative to BaU conditions. Private con-
sumption grows slightly faster than in the baseline, and welfare increases by 185 million lempiras,
or 0.08 percent of GDP in the nal year. Therefore, the economy-wide gains from tari liberaliza-
tion vis- a-vis the US are extremely modest: the improvement in welfare is only 4.2 percent of the
expected gains from full multilateral trade liberalization (see the last column of Table 6). There
are several reasons for this result, and they are explored in the following paragraphs.
The fth and sixth columns of Table 6, CHN and CUS, shed more light on the outcome of the
previous simulation by decomposing trade reform into an own liberalization and US liberalization
27One factor limiting the growth of exports is the US sugar quota, which prevents Honduran producers from
signicantly expanding exports of this commodity.
28Another factor that compounds this increase in taxes is the fact that the price of publicly produced goods (the
only commodity consumed by the government) rises relative to other nal demand prices because the government
uses more expensive labor categories more intensively.
29In 2016, the volume of exports to the US is 3,826 million lempiras above the BaU level, while the volume of
exports to all other markets is 2,153 million lempiras above BaU.
19Table 6: Initial Levels and Changes in Macroeconomic Aggregates, Trade Scenarios
2004 BaU CBL CHN CUS Chi
BL CML FL
GDP at market prices 135.7 4.22 4.23 4.21 4.24 4.23 4.32 4.43
Real GDP at factor cost 120.5 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.23 4.24
Real GDP at market prices 135.7 4.17 4.16 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.18 4.21
Private consumption 116.0 4.15 4.16 4.14 4.17 4.17 4.21 4.31
Public consumption 16.7 4.17 4.16 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.18 4.21
Investment 35.6 4.17 4.16 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.18 4.21
Private investment 28.3 4.17 4.16 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.18 4.21
Public investment 7.3 4.17 4.16 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.18 4.21
Exports 57.3 3.99 4.45 4.48 3.98 5.03 5.21 6.12
Imports 89.9 4.03 4.34 4.34 4.05 4.72 4.89 5.58
Real GDP per capita 19,254 2.16 2.15 2.15 2.16 2.17 2.17 2.20
Real exchange rate 1.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.02
Welfare (EV) 185 -336 532 458 1,612 4,400
Trade-to-GDP 108.5 105.3 110.6 110.8 105.2 117.0 117.9 127.5
Investment/absorption 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.1 21.0
Prv. inv./absorption 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.7
Gov. inv./absorption 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
Gov. cons./absorption 9.9 9.9 9.9 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9
Gov. total spending/abs. 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.2 14.2
Note: For each variable, the \2004" column contains the base year values. GDP and its components are in
billions of lempiras, real GDP per capita is in lempiras, and all ratios are in percentage terms. Columns 3
through 9 show the average annual growth rates between 2004 and 2016 for GDP and components, GDP per
capita, and the exchange rate. The growth rates are calculated assuming exponential growth between the
rst and the last period. Change in welfare is shown as the absolute dierence (in millions of 2004 lempiras)
between the value of the expenditure function in 2016 in BaU and in each of the other simulations. Ratios
such as trade-to-GDP are shown as values in 2016 for each simulation.
Source: Author's calculations.
components. The main point of the CHN column is that own tari liberalization vis- a-vis the US
is actually welfare-reducing for Honduras. This happens despite the fact that consumer prices are
signicantly lower than in BaU and annual growth in total household income (through eects on
factor prices, explored in more detail in the following section) is 0.11 percent above the growth
observed in BaU. The main reason for this outcome is the requirement of a xed scal decit: in
order to compensate for the loss in tari revenue, the direct tax rate in 2016 increases by 1.05
percentage point relative to BaU (from 4.83 to 5.88 percent) and disposable income in the CHN
scenario actually grows slower than in BaU. As a result, consumption and welfare in 2016 are
lower in the CHN scenario relative to BaU. This outcome seems counterintuitive in a (mostly)
neoclassical trade model, especially considering that it is not an artifact of model dynamics but
is also present in comparative static results. However, several qualications are in order. First,
it is important to recognize that this scenario operates in a second-best world. In other words,
while the removal of all tari protection in Honduras (with a revenue-neutral increase in direct
taxes) is unequivocally welfare-enhancing, the same does not need to hold if protection is only
removed versus certain trading partners, such as the US. Second, the area of Harberger's triangles|
the source of eciency gains from trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin world|depends on the ability of
Armington agents to substitute cheaper imports for domestic goods in their consumption basket,
20i.e., Armington elasticities. Finally, the size of Harberger's triangles also depends on the ability
of agents to reallocate production towards more ecient sectors following trade reform, i.e., factor
mobility. In our model, capital is freely mobile across sectors, but labor mobility across farm
and non-farm segments is limited by a migration function. While we believe that this migration
function is a more accurate representation of labor market rigidities in Honduras, as compared to
an assumption of freely mobile labor, the consequence of this setup is smaller welfare gains (or, in
this case, a loss) due to limited factor mobility.
On the other hand, lower taris in the United States are unambiguously welfare-enhancing for
Honduras. Higher export prices raise producer incomes, which allows the households to increase
their consumption levels since the direct tax rates remain virtually unchanged relative to BaU.
Therefore, this decomposition helps explain the modest overall welfare gains under the CBL scenario.
Due to a relatively low initial level of protection in the US, the removal of tari barriers does not
translate into a large increase in export volumes in Honduras. At the same time, the lowering of
taris in Honduras requires an increase in taxes that dampens growth in disposable incomes, which
prevents consumers from taking full advantage of lower import prices.
The welfare gains reported above are signicantly below the estimates provided in the earlier
CGE literature on DR-CAFTA. There are several reasons for this outcome: the gains are specic
to Honduras (rather than Central America in general), the tari data are much more recent (the
base year is 2004 rather than 2001 or 1997), the impact of liberalization of service sectors is not
taken into account, the reform is revenue-neutral, and taris are removed gradually rather than
all at once. The last point is not trivial, but a sensitivity test in which all protection with respect
to the United States is removed immediately yields welfare gains of 331 million in 2016, which is
still considerably below the estimates in the earlier literature. This suggests that the other factors
mentioned above contribute signicantly to the dierence with other studies, although their relative
importance is dicult to ascertain.
The Chi
BL column of Table 6 shows the results of implementing the same pattern of liberalization
as the CBL simulation, but under the assumption of a higher income elasticity for imports than for
domestic goods. As a result, both imports and exports grow faster than in the previous simulations,
and the trade-to-GDP ratio in the nal year is almost 7 percentage points higher than in the CBL
scenario. The welfare gains in the Chi
BL simulation are more than two-and-a-half times higher than
in CBL, reaching 0.2 percent of GDP in the nal year. In this case, increased orientation toward
imports drives down the Armington prices enough to slow the growth in the aggregate price level
relative to the CBL scenario (as measured by the household CPI). Consumer gains from access
to cheaper goods outweigh producer losses from increased import competition and, despite further
losses in tari revenue, lead to (slightly) faster growth in disposable incomes and larger improvement
in welfare. In terms of the remaining macro variables, the dierences between this scenario and
CBL are not very large, conrming that the choice of elasticity values is not likely to have a large
impact on the results when the relative price changes are mild.
The results of the CML simulation oer a signicant contrast to the previously discussed sce-
narios. Welfare gains in this scenario are much larger at 0.7 percent of GDP in the nal year, and
account for 37 percent of the improvement in welfare that could be expected from full multilateral
trade liberalization.30 Imports from the CACM partners and the Dominican Republic rise by more
than the imports from the US: in 2016, import volumes are 10,626 and 9,802 million lempiras above
BaU, respectively. At the same time, the increase in export volumes to CACM and Dominican Re-
30Assuming high Armington income elasticities for the full (multilateral) DR-CAFTA implementation raises the
welfare gains further to 2,202 million lempiras or almost 1 percent of GDP in the nal year.
21public markets is 33 percent larger than the increase in exports to the US: 7,869 million lempiras
vs. 5,935 million. These results are not unexpected, since section 4.3 has shown that Honduran
exporters face an average level of protection in the CACM/DR markets that is 5 times higher than
the US taris, while the Honduran taris on imports from the CACM partners and the Dominican
Republic are more than 30 percent higher those imposed on the rest of the world. Thus, Honduran
consumers gain from signicantly lower prices, while the producers are able to benet from higher
output prices as well as reap eciency gains from having access to cheaper intermediate inputs.
These results suggest that the real benets of DR-CAFTA, at least on the trade side, may not
come from slight improvements in market access to the US but rather from the implementation of
the agreement across the CACM states and the Dominican Republic and the consequent reduction
in intra-CACM protection.
6.3 Sectoral results
The previous section showed that the macroeconomic eects of trade reform with the US are likely
to be very small. However, small changes in economy-wide aggregates often mask larger eects at
the sectoral level. In order to explore these trends, Table 7 shows the changes in exports, imports,
and production for each simulation at the level of detail of the micro-SAM. In this table, all changes
are expressed as percentages relative to the nal year (2016) in the baseline (BaU) scenario.
Consider the imports side rst. Two main factors determine the growth in imports following
the reduction in tari barriers: the extent of the tari cut and the US share in total imports. Table
3 showed that the structure of protection in Honduras is biased toward agricultural sectors, so with
full elimination of taris one would expect the farm sectors to experience the strongest competition
from imports. However, the CBL simulation reduces agricultural taris only by two-thirds while
completely eliminating manufacturing taris by 2016, which means that the greatest reduction in
protection is experienced by the food, beverages, and tobacco and textiles sectors. Table 3 also
showed that US imports account for approximately 40 and 35 percent of the total imports in these
sectors, respectively. Therefore, these sectors experience the largest increases in import volumes
following preferential liberalization with the US. In agriculture, the largest increases in imports take
place in sugar and domestic crops. Although these sectors do not have the highest taris among all
of the farm commodities, an overwhelming share of their imports comes from the United States (76
and 59 percent, respectively), which explains the larger-than-average increase in import volumes.
Overall, taris in agriculture decline by slightly more than in manufacturing (the reduction in
manufacturing taris is 4.67 percent while the reduction in agriculture is 4.86 percent) and this,
combined with a slightly higher US share in total imports, explains why imports of farm products
rise more than the imports of manufactured goods.
Turning now to the exports side, the eects on exports and total production are determined by
changes in the domestic and export prices. The previous paragraph established that the eects of
tari liberalization on consumer prices are limited by the relatively low import dependence of the
most aected sectors. While the imports price index (excluding services) decreases by 1 percent
relative to BaU, the domestic price index falls by 0.1 percent.31 This reects the small magnitude
of the market share losses experienced by domestic producers as a result of increased competition
from imports. However, even a small reduction in domestic prices creates incentives for domestic
producers to sell a larger share of their output abroad. The ability of rms to re-orient their
31The domestic price index is calculated as a weighted average of domestic prices for domestically produced goods,
where the weights are domestic demand volumes in the base year.
22production toward foreign markets depends on the initial share of exports in total production,32
the slope of the exports demand curve, and the transformation elasticities between exports and
domestic supply (CET elasticities).33 As mentioned in section 5, the CET elasticities used in
this paper are not particularly high, and the small country assumption ensures that Honduran
producers face constant prices on the world market regardless of the volumes they desire to sell.34
Therefore, the nal changes in export volumes are determined largely by the export orientation of
each sector and the increase in export prices due to tari liberalization in the US. Not surprisingly,
the largest gains by far are recorded in the textiles sector, which was the most highly protected
sector in the US market (Table 4). However, the increase in the export volume of food, beverages,
and tobacco|the only other sector facing signicant protection in the US|is smaller than several
others including bananas, coee, wood, and mining. This is explained by the fact that all of these
sectors are highly export-intensive (the shares of exports in total production are 57 percent and
above); therefore, falling domestic prices combined with negligible levels of protection in the US
and the EU encourage Honduran rms to re-allocate production toward foreign markets.
The eects on total production are consistent with the analysis of the previous two paragraphs.
Rising export volume is enough to oset the market share losses due to increased imports in the
majority of sectors. There are also important second-order eects, since producers are able to take
advantage of lower prices of intermediate goods to become more competitive in domestic or export
markets. For example, many sectors are aided by the gradual elimination of taris on petroleum
and petroleum products. These second-order eects help explain why import volumes in sectors
such as mining and livestock decline at the same time as import prices are falling.35 This occurs
because the cost savings through lower prices of intermediate goods allow domestic producers to
become more competitive and increase market share even with lower levels of external protection.
Finally, rms in expanding sectors also take advantage of resources (labor and capital) released by
contracting import-competing sectors.36 Overall, however, with the exception of several heavily
export-oriented sectors, the changes in output are generally mild. In fact, total output rises by just
0.9 percent relative to BaU, consistent with the macroeconomic results of the earlier section.
As before, the CHN and CUS columns decompose the total eect of bilateral tari reform (CBL)
into its respective components. Under own liberalization, changes in import volumes are slightly
smaller than under bilateral trade reform, which is largely due to slower income growth (disposable
income grows by 4.17 percent per year as opposed to 4.19 percent average annual growth under
CBL). Perhaps the most interesting aspect of CHN is the changes in domestic production, which
isolate the eects of import competition from the impact of changing export prices. In agriculture,
where the import content of nal demand is relatively low, changes in production volumes are
similar to those recorded in the CBL simulation. On the other hand, the volume of production
in the much more import-competing manufacturing sector declines signicantly relative to the
CBL scenario. Combined with the CUS column, these results show that most of the DR-CAFTA
production gains in the agricultural sectors come from lower prices of intermediate goods, while
changes in production in manufacturing sectors occur largely due to the lowering of tari barriers in
the US. Since the latter decline only marginally, the overall eect on production in manufacturing
32This is also a measure of revealed comparative advantage of Honduran rms.
33More fundamentally, this response also depends on social and economic infrastructure and institutions, such as
roads, ports, access to information and credit, marketing facilities, etc.
34Recall this does not apply to sugar destined for the United States because of the sugar quota.
35Note that these reductions are taking place from a very small base, since the import content of domestic demand
in these sectors is extremely low (0.2 and 2.7 percent, respectively).
36This point will be discussed in more detail in section 6.4.
23sectors is negative.
The pattern of adjustment in the Chi
BL scenario largely parallels that of CBL. Since demand
growth in this scenario is more import-intensive, imports volumes increase more than twice as
much as in the CBL simulation. The eects on exports volumes are also much larger than under
CBL, which is largely due to the same mechanisms as those identied in the previous paragraph.
Consider the eects of Chi
BL on domestic production. In agriculture, where the eects of lower input
prices dominate the increased competition from imports, domestic producers are able to benet
even more by demanding more import-intensive inputs. In manufacturing, Honduran rms have
diculties competing with cheaper imports and total production rises by less than CBL while also
becoming more export-oriented. The net eect is a signicant acceleration in total production,
which increases from a 0.9 percent gain in the CBL scenario to 1.9 percent in Chi
BL.
The outcome of the CML simulation is quite dierent from the scenarios described above due to
the higher level of taris levied against the CACM partners and the Dominican Republic, combined
with signicant dierences in the structure of protection and trade. The removal of protection vis-
 a-vis the rest of Central America leads to import volumes rising 2.8 times as much as in the
CBL simulation, while the volume of exports is 2.7 times higher. On the import side, the sectors
experiencing the largest increases in imports include food, beverages, and tobacco, textiles, metals,
minerals, and machinery, and domestic crops. Metals, minerals, and machinery register only minor
changes in import volumes in the CBL scenario, largely due to the fact that imports in this sector
are protected from US competition by a relatively low tari of 2.2 percent (as opposed to 8.8 percent
tari on exports from the rest of Central America). Thus, removal of protection throughout DR-
CAFTA results in a larger increase in import competition in this sectors than tari reductions with
the US alone.
Unlike in CBL, textiles is no longer the sector that experiences the biggest increase in export
volume following the liberalization of trade throughout CACM and the Dominican Republic. In-
stead, metals, minerals, and machinery and paper register the largest gains due to the fact that
the tari rates in these sectors are more than twice the average faced by a Honduran exporter and
the majority of exports of these products are already destined for the CACM and the Dominican
Republic markets. Overall, the increase in the volume of non-farm exports outpaces the rise in
farm exports by a factor of 5 to 1, compared with a 2 to 1 ratio in the CBL simulation. The largest
dierences between the two scenarios, however, can be found on the production side. In contrast
to the CBL scenario, in which higher export prices and lower input costs in manufacturing led to
a rather mild increase in the volume of output, in the CML scenario non-farm production rises by
10.9 percent relative to the baseline and 9.3 percent relative to the CBL scenario. The magnitude
of these changes should be interpreted with caution, since it is mostly driven by a very large pro-
duction increase in a single sector. However, the overall pattern of changes in production in the
CML scenario parallels the full liberalization outcome much more closely than the CBL simulation.
This suggests that bilateral trade liberalization vis- a-vis the US may not only result in a sectoral
allocation of resources that is not fully consistent with a multilateral reduction in taris, but also































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Until now, the analysis in this paper has been largely focused on the eects of nal goods prices on
sectoral adjustment. However, changes in input prices also play an important role in determining
the nal equilibrium. The previous sub-section mentioned that the expanding sectors are able to
increase output volumes by absorbing labor and capital that are released by the contracting sectors.
Since the stocks of labor and capital grow exogenously in the simulations in this paper, the eects
of trade reform on factor prices are mainly determined on the demand side and largely follow the
sectoral factor intensities shown in Table 5.
First, consider the initial conditions, which are summarized in the second column (labeled
\2004") of Table 8 for each factor type. Section 4.2 has already noted that the large wage dieren-
tials across farm and non-farm segments are indicative of barriers to labor mobility, and therefore
justify the segmented labor markets approach of this paper.37 The migration function allows a
small number of workers to respond to these wage dierentials by moving from farm to non-farm
activities.38 If non-farm wages grow faster than earnings in agriculture, migration rises; otherwise,
it declines. Therefore, the evolution of factor prices in each of the simulations is determined by
four major factors: labor supply growth rates, initial earnings dierentials across segments (which
can aect labor supply growth at the segment level through migration), initial factor intensities by
sector (which determine which factors are most likely to gain or lose), and the pattern of growth
(which determines the magnitude and direction of demand shocks).
Table 8: Initial Levels and Changes in Factor Prices and Migration, Trade Scenarios
2004 BaU CBL CHN CUS Chi
BL CML FL
Non-farm unskilled wage 37.13 0.63 0.72 0.71 0.64 0.71 0.86 1.11
Non-farm skilled wage 59.56 1.36 1.50 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.51 1.60
Farm unskilled wage 6.16 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.41 0.12
Farm skilled wage 10.16 0.28 0.15 0.14 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.01
Unskilled migration 7893 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.45 0.99
Skilled migration 504 1.07 1.34 1.29 1.14 1.31 1.18 1.59
Average unskilled wage 23.45 1.08 1.16 1.15 1.10 1.15 1.30 1.52
Average skilled wage 54.51 1.43 1.56 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.58 1.66
Average tertiary skilled wage 125.12 1.65 1.74 1.74 1.65 1.67 2.08 2.32
Average capital rent 1.00 -0.07 0.08 0.10 -0.09 0.15 0.20 0.42
Note: For each variable, the \2004" column contains the base year values. Wages are reported in thousands
of lempiras, and rural-to-urban migration in number of workers. The real rental rate is normalized to one
in the base year. Columns 3 through 8 show the average annual growth rates between 2004 and 2016 for
each of the variables, in percentage terms. The growth rates are calculated assuming exponential growth
between the rst and the last period. All migration is internal to Honduras.
Source: Author's calculations.
The slight decline in the capital rental rate in the BaU scenario is explained by a gradual
(albeit very small) rise in the capital-output ratio over time. Average, or economy-wide, wages
of skilled and tertiary-skilled labor rise faster than the wages of unskilled workers because with
rising incomes, demand for products with higher income elasticities increases faster than average
and the production of these commodities (manufactured goods and especially services) is more
37Note that only the unskilled and skilled labor markets are segmented|workers with tertiary education are allowed
to switch sectors freely.
38Recall that in the base year, migration is set to 1 percent of the farm labor force, excluding the tertiary-skilled.
26skill-intensive (Table 5). Similarly, dierences in wage growth at the segment level are explained
by dierential growth rates of labor demand by sector. Since farm production grows slower than
total production (3.72 percent versus 3.94 percent per year, respectively), there is less demand for
workers in these sectors and less upward pressure on wages. On the other hand, labor demand
in non-farm activities exceeds the economy-wide average, resulting in growing wage dierentials
between workers in agriculture and other sectors. In response to these rising wage premiums,
migration gradually increases throughout the model horizon.
Under the CBL scenario, the largest increases in production take place in the farm sectors, which
use capital and land most intensively. Therefore, aggregate capital stands to gain the most from
trade liberalization. Tertiary-skilled and secondary-skilled labor receive slightly smaller gains, and
unskilled labor gains the least. In order to understand the reasons behind these developments, it is
useful to consider the two decomposition scenarios. Recall that, in the model of this paper, capital
and tertiary-skilled labor are complements at one level of the production process.39 Therefore, in
the CHN scenario, which section 6.3 showed benets mostly agriculture, capital and then tertiary-
skilled labor are the biggest winners. On the other hand, under CUS the biggest gains are in
manufacturing, which uses skilled labor intensively. In this scenario, skilled and then unskilled
workers stand to gain the most. The combination of these two scenarios produces the nal eects
observed in the CBL column of Table 8.
The evolution of factor prices under CBL at the sectoral level is determined by the changes in
sector production volumes (Table 7). Although total production of agriculture rises in the CBL
scenario, output of domestic crops contracts by 1.6 percent due to increased competition from
imports. Since this sector is the largest employer of labor in agriculture (86 percent of unskilled
and 94 percent of skilled agricultural workers are employed in this sector), labor demand falls and
the wages of farm workers decline. In turn, slower wage growth in agriculture encourages a faster
pace of migration toward non-farm occupations.
The changes in factor prices in the Chi
BL scenario are largely similar to those in the CBL sim-
ulation. As noted in section 6.3, Chi
BL results in an even more pronounced increase in agricultural
production. This accelerates growth in returns to capital, which increase by twice as much as in
the CBL simulation. Because the Chi
BL scenario leads to even larger production losses in domestic
crops (compared to the CBL simulation), farm wage growth is slower than before.
Section 6.3 showed that the CML simulation benets manufacturing much more than agriculture,
which explains why skilled and unskilled workers receive the largest wage gains in this scenario. This
also explains why non-farm workers gain relatively more, although both farm and non-farm wages
grow faster than in BaU and CBL since production volumes in both agriculture and manufacturing
are higher in CML than in CBL. The capital rental rate grows faster in this scenario than in CBL,
despite the fact that agricultural sectors are generally more capital intensive than manufacturing.
This happens because a large share of production gains in manufacturing in the CML scenario is
driven by one sector, metals, minerals, and machinery, which is quite capital-intensive. As a result,
the economy-wide demand for capital is higher than in any of the previous scenarios, and the rental
rate increases.
An important drawback of the analysis presented above is that all simulations assume a con-
stant rate of unemployment and therefore discount any additional employment opportunities that
39In other words, the capital/labor bundle is composed of a capital/tertiary-skilled labor bundle and a secondary-
skilled/unskilled labor bundle. Therefore, at this node of the nested CES structure, tertiary-skilled labor and capital
are complements. At the next level of CES disaggregation however, capital and tertiary-skilled labor become substi-
tutes.
27may be created or lost through DR-CAFTA. While the introduction of a exible unemployment
rate through semi-rigidity in wages is straightforward in the CGE model used in this paper, the
specication of the minimum wage path that gives rise to unemployment is much more compli-
cated. In order to provide a quick illustration of the potential employment eects of DR-CAFTA,
we instead implement a simple approach of xing real wages at BaU levels and allowing the growth
of the labor supply to become endogenous. In other words, labor supply in every time period is
determined by labor demand. The results show that by 2016, the employment of unskilled, skilled,
and tertiary-skilled workers would rise by 3.6, 5.3, and 3.9 percent relative to BaU under the CBL
liberalization schedule. Overall, an additional 136,788 jobs are created in this scenario|a 3.9 per-
cent increase from BaU|and 66 percent of these new workers are unskilled. Most of this increase
comes from employment gains in the non-farm sector: while agricultural employment increases by
7,710 workers, employment in non-agriculture rises by 119,590 workers.40 Although the magnitude
of employment gains is not large relative to the total stock of workers (3.8 percent of total em-
ployment in 2015), the additional jobs created in this scenario are approximately equal to the base
year employment in all agricultural sectors with the exception of domestic crops. Furthermore,
the real GDP gains in this scenario signicantly surpass the GDP eects of other simulations due
to the increase in the stock of productive factors. Therefore, these results suggest that even a
moderate degree of wage rigidity (a plausible assumption for Honduras) may give rise to signicant
employment creation following the bilateral liberalization of trade vis- a-vis the US. They should
also assuage one of the main concerns of policy makers with regard to trade reform: potential
employment losses in agriculture.
6.5 Compatibility of regional liberalization with multilateral reform
Up to this point, we have considered the eects of various trade liberalization scenarios indepen-
dently of each other. However, since negotiations on regional and multilateral reform often take
place simultaneously, policymakers are legitimately concerned about the compatibility of various
liberalization scenarios with each other. Since entering into comprehensive trade liberalization
agreements may be politically dicult, policymakers may prefer to sign smaller and/or regional
agreements as stepping stones toward broader reform in the future. This section provides an em-
pirical assessment of such strategies by contrasting the patterns of structural adjustment implied
by the DR-CAFTA scenarios with full trade liberalization vis- a-vis all trading partners. In other
words, we would like to know whether the \partial" liberalization scenarios result in a sectoral
allocation of resources that is compatible with full liberalization, in the following sense. If partial
liberalization attracts resources to the same sectors that would prosper under free trade, the sce-
nario is considered congruent with the full liberalization. If, on the other hand, a scenario results in
a sectoral allocation of resources dierent from that implied by full liberalization, then additional
costs must be incurred to re-allocate resources when (if) free trade is concluded. Using the termi-
nology of Bhagwati (1991), the regional agreement in the latter example could be characterized as
a \stumbling block" rather than a \building block" toward a global free trade regime.
In order to assess the compatibility of each partial scenario with global reform, this paper relies
on a congruence metric proposed in World Bank (2004, Chapter 2), which is a measure of labor
market \churning" generated by each scenario. This labor market adjustment consists of two parts:
(1) movement from the initial equilibrium to the partial reform scenario, and (2) movement from
40The total does not sum to 136,788 jobs reported earlier because tertiary-skilled labor (included in the latter) is
not segmented by sector.
28the partial reform scenario to global free trade. Thus, it is a two-step distance from the initial
point to full liberalization, and, if the partial reform is perfectly compatible with free trade, this
distance should be exactly equal to the one-step distance of moving from the initial point to full
liberalization directly. This measure of congruence is normalized so that it is equal to one when a
partial reform is perfectly compatible with global free trade, and is greater than one when additional
labor market \churning" is required to reach the desired outcome in two steps. Congruence  is












































where LDi is labor demand by sector, LD is total labor demand, and 0, p, and f denote the base
year, nal year of the partial reform, and nal year of the full reform, respectively. It should be
noted that this measure of congruence is sensitive to the level of aggregation of the model (i.e. the
number of sectors), and, ceteris paribus, is likely to be higher in models with ner levels of sectoral
detail.
Table 9 summarizes this congruence measure for some of the simulations described in the earlier
sections. In all cases, preferential reform implies a pattern of sectoral adjustment that is inconsistent
with full liberalization against all trading partners (FL). The largest dierences between partial
liberalization and full reform are observed for the CBL and Chi
BL scenarios. This is because taris
in Honduras are already low and biased against the rest of the world (excluding the US and the
EU). Therefore, further liberalization vis- a-vis the US results in an additional deepening of this
bias, which must be corrected when taris against all trading partners|and their taris against
Honduras|are eliminated. In particular, trade reform in the CBL and Chi
BL scenarios heavily favors
agricultural production, while full liberalization (FL) benets manufacturing relatively more. On
the other hand, in a scenario where the DR-CAFTA preferences are phased in with regard to all
trading partners, the congruence metric is signicantly lower. This result is not surprising since
section 6.3 has shown that CML benets manufacturing production relatively more, and this brings
the country closer to the full multilateral outcome (FL).
Table 9: Congruence between DR-CAFTA and Full Trade Liberalization
CBL Chi
BL CML
Distance: baseline (BaU) to partial 1.23 1.23 1.04
Distance: partial to global (FL) 0.45 0.41 0.22
Congruence 1.67 1.63 1.25
Source: Author's calculations.
Since the movement of workers across sectors is rarely frictionless, these results suggest that
the implementation of DR-CAFTA as a hub-and-spoke arrangement between the US and CACM
partners (together with the Dominican Republic) could be very costly in terms of subsequent
transition to global free trade, should it occur. Although we lack a truly global model with which to
contrast the patterns of regional and global comparative advantage for Honduras, this result implies
that the products Honduras sells to the US may not represent its global comparative advantage if
29all trade barriers were removed. While the analysis in this section is largely illustrative, it does show
the importance of the sequencing of trade reforms. For example, policymakers may be inclined to
advocate \minor" regional liberalization as a stepping stone to \major" global reform. However, as
shown in Table 9, such policy may re-inforce the existing biases in trade structure in a country like
Honduras. The sequencing of reforms becomes particularly important when labor markets are not
very exible because the costs of reallocating labor once for the regional and then again for the free
trade scenario could be very high, both in terms of lost incomes and productivity and increased
government spending on job training and social safety nets. Although these costs are not captured
in the model employed in this paper, they are likely to lead to even lower welfare gains than are
suggested by the simulations in the previous sections. On the other hand, some of these costs could
be mitigated by various advantages of regional cooperation which are also not considered in this
analysis, such as economies of scale generated by larger markets and improvements in investment
climate. However, the key message is that reallocating labor across sectors is costly, particularly
so when labor markets are rigid, and failure to carefully consider the sequencing of trade policy
reforms can result in large additional adjustment costs.
7 Foreign Direct Investment
7.1 Description of simulations
In the simulations presented up to this point, the removal of merchandise trade barriers has been
the only driver of allocative eects and welfare gains or losses from DR-CAFTA. However, changing
trade prices may not be the only, or even the largest, source of benets for Honduras. For example,
exporting and importing more varieties of goods, as well as importing products with higher R&D
content, may result in signicant productivity spillovers in the domestic economy. Similarly, the
implementation of DR-CAFTA may lead to an increased level of FDI inows, which could provide an
important source of nancing for capital-intensive industries, spur the development of new sectors,
and bring newer and more productive technology to Honduras. In fact, Medvedev (2006a,b) has
argued that the expectation of increased FDI inows is a likely driver behind the proliferation of
new PTAs, and that the FDI benets (which are signicant for a large sample of countries and
agreements) may be more important than the preferential tari reductions.
There are a number of reasons to expect FDI inows to increase following the implementation
of DR-CAFTA provisions between the US and Honduras. Following the framework in Medvedev
(2006a), one could identify ve main transmission channels which could lead to higher FDI inows
both from the US and third parties (i.e., countries that are not members of DR-CAFTA):
1. Removal of barriers to cross-border investment ows
2. Improvements in investment climate (e.g., through trade capacity building eorts)
3. Complementarity of trade and investment ows (establishment of production networks)
4. Access to a larger common market
5. Dynamic growth eects
Without major modications to the current model structure, it is not possible to model any of these
channels explicitly. For example, we do not have any estimates of barriers to investment ows, or
even a good idea of trade barriers in the service sectors. Similarly, it is not easy to incorporate
30measures of investment climate into a real model. In addition, the current model structure does not
include features that allow FDI to have certain \special" eects on the domestic economy, such as
increasing returns to scale and endogenous mark-ups in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, product dier-
entiation by rm ownership and location of production, or the use of business services (provided by
both domestic rms and foreign multinationals) as essential inputs into the production process (see
Lejour and Rojas-Romagosa, 2006, for a review of relevant literature). Instead, this section consid-
ers some basic links between preferential trade liberalization and FDI inows through reduced-form
parameter estimates obtained from econometric studies. Although clearly simplistic, the approach
is very transparent while still allowing us to evaluate the dierent channels of transmission of FDI
shocks.
In order to implement the FDI scenarios in this section, we make several modications to the
dataset and the dynamic updating equations. To accurately model the increase in foreign capital
stock following the potential acceleration in FDI, we need to distinguish capital by ownership type
(domestic or foreign) and, for the agricultural sectors, to distinguish capital from land. The latter
is important because, as shown in section 4.4, capital intensities in agriculture are much higher
than capital intensities in manufacturing and services, which is a result of attributing all land and
natural resource income to aggregate capital, as well as potential misclassication of self-employed
income. This issue was not particularly relevant for the trade simulations but is very important
for the scenarios in this section, since the base year distribution of capital stocks by sector largely
determines the allocation of new investment. Unfortunately, data on capital and land value added is
not readily available for Honduras, and therefore we rely on the Central America SAM from GTAP
to separate the two. For each farm sector in this SAM, capital accounts for 47 percent of the total
capital-land value added bundle, and we use this information to split payments to aggregate capital
into capital and land payments for bananas, coee, sugar, livestock, non-traditional and domestic
crops. For the remaining sectors, all payments to aggregate capital are assumed to go to \proper"
capital.
The next step is to distinguish capital by foreign and domestic ownership. Because data on
capital stocks by ownership is not available for Honduras, we must make an assumption about which
sectors use foreign capital in the base year and, more importantly, which sectors are likely to receive
the additional FDI generated by DR-CAFTA. A simple solution would be to assume that foreign
capital exists in every sector and, allowing the rental rate to be the same for both types of capital,
use a fraction such as the ratio of capital income remitted abroad to total capital income to split the
capital value added into domestic and foreign components. However, this approach is not likely to
be very interesting or realistic. Instead, it is not implausible to assume that foreign capital will only
ow into those sectors that are likely to experience the largest increases in export volumes following
trade reform under DR-CAFTA. In particular, we consider the export changes generated by the
CBL scenario in the previous section, since much of the new investment is likely to be attracted by
Honduras having improved access to the US market.41 Therefore, we assume that foreign capital
only exists and will be attracted to bananas, coee, mining, wood, food/beverages/tobacco, and
textiles and wearing apparel sectors (we will call these the FDI-target sectors). Assuming that
rental rates are the same across all of these (mainly because any other assumption would require
additional data that is not available), we can use the ratio of capital income remitted abroad to total
capital income (7 percent) to calculate the payments to each capital type. This share, however,
is not consistent with the composition of private investment, which is 84 percent domestic and 16
41See, for example, Medvedev (2006a), which uses a measure of an extended common market from preferential
trade liberalization to quantify net FDI gains from joining PTAs.
31percent foreign. If the foreign capital stock is only 7 percent of the total capital stock in Honduras
while foreign investment is 16 percent of total investment, foreign capital must depreciate much
faster than domestic capital to avoid a falling rental rate in the absence of any shocks. This is not
very plausible; instead, it is likely that not all income from foreign capital is remitted abroad, and
therefore payments to foreign capital should be higher than 7 percent of total capital value added.
One solution is to use the ratio of total private investment to FDI, but this is problematic if we
want to restrict our attention to the sectors mentioned above, due to the fact that foreign capital
value added calculated in this way exceeds total payments to capital in these sectors. Instead,
we assume that foreign capital stock accounts for 13 percent of total capital stock in Honduras,
which ensures that both foreign and domestic capital grow at roughly the same rate under BaU
conditions (see the discussion in the following paragraph).
On the factor supply side, FDI and domestic investment are now treated separately, rather than
both contributing to a single pool of investment which adds to the last period's depreciated capital
stock. Foreign capital is replenished exclusively through FDI, which grows at the same rate as GDP
in the baseline.42 We assume that all FDI is used as real investment in new assets, rather than the
acquisition of existing assets. There is no easy way of separating the two in the model used in this
paper; however, this implies that the numerical simulations that follow potentially overestimate the
eects of new FDI on additional capital formation. Growth in the domestic capital stock in each
period is determined by the volume of domestic investment, which is a xed ratio of real GDP at
market prices. The choice of the base year ratio of foreign to domestic capital stock ensures that
both grow at approximately 4.3 percent per year. On the production side, we assume that foreign
and domestic capital are imperfect substitutes.
In order to quantify the potential FDI gains for Honduras, we consider the changes in net FDI
inows and the FDI-to-GDP ratio in Mexico before and after NAFTA (Figure 2). Using the data
from WDI, we calculate that the three-year averages for these variables increased by 133.2 and 143.7
percent, respectively. Since the two estimates are fairly close, we apply the increase in net FDI
inows (the former estimate) to the BaU FDI path in order to calculate the FDI shock. Compared
to the baseline, where FDI grows from 3,645 million lempiras in 2004 to 5,949 million in 2016, this
approach to calculating the investment shock projects FDI to increase to 13,874 million by 2016.
The average FDI-to-GDP ratio more than doubles, rising from 2.7 percent in the baseline to 6.1
percent.
It is important to emphasize that our estimate of the potential increase in net FDI inows in
Honduras is not a forecast but simply an input into a simulation exercise. We believe that the
magnitude of the potential shock, derived from the Mexico analogy, represents a reasonable guess
of the possible eect on FDI in Honduras. Yet, there are several reasons why this increase may
be too optimistic. Unlike the pre-NAFTA Mexico, Honduras does not share a border with the
US, already has virtually tari-free access to the US market through the CBI, and has to compete
with other developing members of DR-CAFTA (as well as other countries with which the US has
a preferential trade agreement) for the potential new FDI inows. Furthermore, China is a much
bigger factor today than it was in the mid-1990s, when NAFTA was adopted, and the post-NAFTA
global FDI environment was more favorable than it is today (i.e., there was a global boom in FDI
in the mid-to-late 1990s). All these factors suggest that it is far from certain that Honduras may be
able to reap similar FDI benets from DR-CAFTA as Mexico was able to gain from NAFTA. Thus,
42The growth rate of FDI is set in foreign currency units, but its contribution to capital stock is valued at base
year domestic prices. Therefore, changes in the real exchange rate will aect the growth rate of foreign capital stock.
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Figure 2: Pre- and post-NAFTA FDI in Mexico
Source: WDI.
the FDI scenarios that follow should be viewed as a \best-case" scenario, although, for example,
Medvedev (2006a) suggests that many countries have been able to reap even larger FDI gains from
preferential liberalization.
Bilateral CAFTA and increased FDI inows (IBL). The rst simulation in this section adds
the FDI shock described above to the CBL scenario described in section 6.1. For the moment, we
leave aside the issues of dynamic growth eects of FDI as well as potential productivity spillovers,
and focus only on the level eects. We also assume that new FDI is an addition to, rather than
a replacement of, domestic investment. This does not need to be the case; for example, evidence
from Mexico shows that while the FDI-to-GDP ratio rose signicantly after NAFTA (Figure 2),
total investment to GDP ratio rose only slightly.43 Since it is dicult to predict a priori whether
potential new FDI in Honduras is likely to be a substitute or a complement to domestic investment,
we allow the new FDI to become a net addition to total investment in the current scenario and
explore the implications of relaxing this assumption in one of the following simulations.
Increased FDI inows (I00). This decomposition scenario separates the eects of increased FDI
inows from the eects of trade liberalization by imposing the FDI shock of the previous simulation
(IBL) without any reductions in the level of taris.
Bilateral CAFTA and increased FDI inows with FDI a substitute for domestic investment
(Isub
BL). This simulation is identical to the IBL scenario except for the investment closure. In the
Isub
BL scenario, the investment-to-GDP ratio remains unchanged after the FDI shock, which means
that the new FDI replaces domestic private investment rather than complementing it.
Multilateral CAFTA and increased FDI inows (IML). In this simulation, tari reductions are
43WDI data indicate that in the three years after NAFTA (1995{1997), the average investment-to-GDP ratio
declined by half a percentage point relative to the average ratio three years before NAFTA. However, this decline
mostly reects the 2 percentage point drop in the ratio in 1995 as a result of the crisis. Looking at ve-year averages
shows that the post-NAFTA investment-to-GDP ratio rose by 1.6 percentage points, although this ratio has been
declining since reaching a peak in 1999 and is currently identical to the 1992{1993 investment-to-GDP share.
33phased in with respect to all participants of DR-CAFTA (US, CACM countries, and the Dominican
Republic) in addition to increased net FDI inows. The FDI shock is exactly the same as in the
IBL scenario, both in its magnitude and in the sectors that benet from increased net FDI inows.
There are several reasons why one may expect the FDI shock to be dierent in this scenario: rst,
the implementation of DR-CAFTA as a multilateral arrangement gives Honduras improved access
to a larger common market, and second, the sectors that benet the most from the CML-type
trade liberalization are not the same as the ones experiencing the largest gains in the CBL scenario.
However, the marginal increase in the size of the PTA market from implementing DR-CAFTA as a
multilateral agreement is almost negligible because the combined GDP of Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua was only 0.73 percent of US GDP in 2004.
Therefore, if extended market size is an important determinant of net FDI inows|as suggested
in Medvedev (2006a)|the FDI shock would be virtually the same regardless of whether Honduras
gains additional market access to its CACM partners. Furthermore, changing the magnitude of the
FDI shock would tend to simply scale the results without aecting the pattern of adjustment.
On the other hand, we can expect more pronounced dierences in the outcomes if IML and IBL
attract FDI to dierent sectors. However, if most of the new FDI is likely to arrive because Honduras
gains access to the US market, then one would expect that FDI to be targeted to sectors that sell
a large share of their exports to the US and/or are likely to experience signicant improvements in
market access to the US following trade liberalization (in other words, the sectors that gain the most
in the CBL scenario). Thus, although the implementation of DR-CAFTA provisions throughout the
CACM partners and the Dominican Republic could result in a dierent magnitude and pattern of
net FDI inows into Honduras, we believe that major dierences from the IBL scenario are unlikely
and therefore keep the same FDI shock in both IBL and IML.
Bilateral CAFTA and increased FDI inows with productivity spillovers (IL
BL). This scenario
introduces the dynamic growth eects of FDI that were brought up earlier in this section. There
are several reasons to expect that DR-CAFTA may lead to increased productivity levels in Hon-
duras, including higher knowledge content of foreign investment, development of backward linkages
between foreign subsidiaries and domestic rms, improved investment climate through the lock-
in of reforms, trade capacity building promised by the US, or the exit of less ecient rms due
to increased import competition (rm self-selection).44 The implementation of this productivity
scenario is almost identical to IBL with the only dierence being a modication to the labor pro-
ductivity growth equation (1). The IL
BL simulation adds a new parameter to this equation which
allows labor productivity in all sectors to respond to faster growth in FDI inows (productivity


























and the 0 superscript denotes the time path of FDI in the BaU scenario. If 'fdi is set at 0, equation
(3) collapses to the earlier specication (1); a positive value of 'fdi yields a higher level of labor
productivity in the time period immediately following a period of accelerated growth in FDI.
44The last channel has received substantial empirical support in the literature on both high-income and developing
countries, as summarized in Feenstra (2006). Treer (2004) cautions that long-term gains in productivity can come
at the expense of short-term employment losses as less ecient rms exit the market, although he argues that in the
long term these losses disappear through employment creation in other, more productive plants.
34The value of 'fdi (or similar elasticities) has been the subject of extensive empirical research
in the FDI literature. While economic theory has proposed multiple channels of potential FDI
spillovers, econometric evidence of their existence is far from conclusive.45 Using cross-sectional
data, earlier studies on the subject have found positive productivity spillovers at the sector level.
These include Caves (1974) and Globerman (1979), who provide evidence of a positive relation-
ship between higher subsidiary shares and increased productivity levels in Australia and Canada,
respectively. For developing countries, Blomstrom (1986) and Blomstrom and Wol (1994) show
that the share of foreign subsidiaries has a positive eect on eciency and the rate of productivity
catch-up in Mexico. However, these and other cross-sectional studies cannot establish causality: it
is not clear whether the relationship between foreign ownership and productivity is positive because
foreign investment generates signicant spillovers or because FDI is attracted to more productive
sectors. In order to address this issue, more recent research has focused on rm-level panel data, but
the evidence in favor of positive spillovers is much less clear. For example, Haddad and Harrison
(1993) nd no evidence that foreign entry has had an eect on productivity growth of Moroc-
can rms, although the higher degrees of foreign ownership are associated with lower productivity
dispersion. Aitken and Harrison (1999) establish a positive relationship between foreign equity
participation and productivity for the foreign subsidiary plants, but negative spillovers for domes-
tic rms in Venezuela. Similarly, Djankov and Hoekman (1999) nd a positive eect of foreign
investment on productivity of rms in the Czech Republic, but the relationship turns insignicant
when the sample is reduced to domestic rms only. Other studies have instead focused on vertical
(mostly downstream) rather than horizontal spillovers and have found a positive relationship be-
tween foreign investment and productivity growth in domestic rms. These include Blalock (2001)
for Indonesia and Smarzynska (2002) for Lithuania.
Although the previous paragraph mentions only a few (out of the many existing) studies on the
subject, one can already see three broad patterns emerging. First, the existence of productivity
spillovers to domestic rms is uncertain, while the evidence for higher productivity among foreign
aliates is much more robust. Second, if productivity spillovers exist, they are much more likely
to be found among rms that have backward linkages to foreign aliates rather than rms in the
same sector as the foreign subsidiaries. Third, the existing studies relate productivity spillovers to
the share of foreign-owned rms in a sector, or the percentage of output sold to foreign-controlled
subsidiaries, rather than FDI itself. Therefore, it is dicult to translate the ndings of this literature
into a value (or a range of values) for the 'fdi parameter. This paper sets the 'fdi parameter equal
to 0.0005; given the baseline time paths for labor productivity and FDI, the average elasticity of L
i;l
with respect to foreign direct investment in the IL
BL scenario turns out to be approximately 0.003.46
The elasticity estimates with respect to foreign ownership shares reported in the studies referenced
above usually range between 0.03 and 0.06. Therefore, if one assumes that a one percent rise in net
FDI inows results in a less than one percentage point increase in the share of foreign ownership
(at the economy-wide level), then our parameter choice is roughly consistent with the existing
literature. In any case, given the large data requirements and complicated econometric techniques
needed to generate point estimates of the 'fdi parameter for Honduras, properly quantifying this
elasticity would be beyond the scope of this paper. The aim of this simulation is to simply illustrate
the qualitative importance of productivity spillovers.
45The following discussion is based on Iacovone and Perini (2007).
46Note that this elasticity is positive only for the manufacturing and service sectors; labor productivity in agriculture
remains exogenous in this simulation.
357.2 Macroeconomic results
The behavior of the macroeconomic variables for each of the simulations discussed in the previous
sub-section is summarized in Table 10. As before, the base year equilibrium and results for the
BaU scenario are reported for ease of reference and comparison. It should be noted that the BaU
results reported in Table 10 are not identical to those shown in Table 6 due to dierences in the
production nesting (two types of capital require an additional CET nest, as does the land-capital
bundle) and capital stock updating equations. By 2016, the welfare gains in the IBL scenario
signicantly outpace those observed under CBL, reaching 1.85 percent of GDP. The additional
gains can be attributed almost entirely to the faster rate of expansion in the capital stock, which
grows by 5.11 percent per year in IBL versus 4.26 percent per year in BaU. This can be seen by
observing that welfare gains in the I00 scenario, in which world prices remain the same as in the
BaU simulation, account for 95 percent of total welfare improvement in IBL.47. Faster growth of
the capital stock leads to more rapid growth of real GDP, which by 2016 is 2 percent above the
real GDP in BaU.
The trade-to-GDP ratio increases by nearly 8 percentage points relative to BaU, compared
with a 5 percentage point increase observed in the CBL simulation. Furthermore, unlike the CBL
scenario, most of the increase in trade is due to faster import growth, while the acceleration in
export growth is much more mild. The main reason for this is real exchange rate appreciation
due to increase in foreign capital inows. This is more easily seen in the I00 scenario, where the
real exchange rate appreciates by 0.1 percent per year, or about 1 percent over the entire model
period. This is a manifestation of \Dutch disease," when foreign capital inows raise incomes and
drive up domestic prices relative to world prices. These relative price changes make production
less protable in export-oriented and import-competing sectors, yielding a new equilibrium with
lower exports, higher imports, and lower real exchange rate. These mechanisms are still present
in the IBL scenario, but the impacts of Dutch disease are mostly oset by falling import prices,
which ceteris paribus lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore, these results show
that lowering taris can be an eective vehicle for neutralizing the negative eects of Dutch disease
on export competitiveness, in addition to the traditional policies of sterilization by means of a
stabilization fund or public investment in infrastructure (which are not considered in this model).
Another way to look at the same issue is to consider a simple current account setup with only
exports and imports. When the balance on the capital account rises due to increased FDI, imports
must rise relative to exports in order to equilibrate the inows and outows of foreign currency.
In order for the larger quantity of imports to be absorbed without a corresponding rise in exports,
the real exchange rate must appreciate. In the absence of DR-CAFTA tari cuts, the increase
in imports would be allocated across Honduras' trading partners according to the BaU import
shares; with trade reform, increased imports are biased toward the US. Thus, there is signicantly
less import diversion in the IBL scenario when compared with CBL. Imports from the US rise by
16,017 million lempiras (38.8 percent increase over BaU), while imports from other destinations
fall by 3,140 million lempiras (11.4 percent decrease from BaU).
The welfare gains in the Isub
BL scenario are 87 percent higher than in the IBL simulation, despite
the fact that real GDP per capita grows 0.26 percentage points per year slower than IBL and
0.1 percentage points per year slower than BaU. This occurs because foreigners essentially take
over much of the saving responsibilities of the Honduran households, and the share of saving in
47Please note that this is an observation rather than a rigorous decomposition exercise. The welfare gains from
CBL and I00 scenarios do not exactly add up to the total welfare improvement recorded in the IBL scenario
36Table 10: Initial Levels and Changes in Macroeconomic Aggregates, FDI Scenarios
2004 BaU IBL I00 Isub
BL IML IL
BL
GDP at market prices 135.7 4.20 4.42 4.40 4.12 4.50 4.46
Real GDP at factor cost 120.5 4.22 4.43 4.43 4.18 4.43 4.47
Real GDP at market prices 135.7 4.17 4.33 4.33 4.07 4.34 4.37
Private consumption 116.0 4.14 4.30 4.29 4.43 4.34 4.33
Public consumption 16.7 4.17 4.33 4.33 4.07 4.34 4.37
Investment 35.6 4.16 5.39 5.38 4.07 5.41 5.42
Private investment 28.3 4.16 5.65 5.63 4.07 5.66 5.68
Public investment 7.3 4.17 4.33 4.33 4.07 4.34 4.37
Exports 57.3 4.01 4.73 4.30 4.15 5.29 4.77
Imports 89.9 4.04 4.97 4.69 4.58 5.37 5.00
Real GDP per capita 19254 2.16 2.32 2.32 2.06 2.33 2.36
Real exchange rate 1.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
Welfare (EV) 4213 4011 7888 5474 5117
Trade-to-GDP 108.5 106.0 113.7 108.9 111.8 119.2 113.7
Investment/absorption 21.2 21.2 23.3 23.3 20.6 23.3 23.3
Prv. inv./absorption 16.8 16.8 19.1 19.1 16.3 19.0 19.1
Gov. inv./absorption 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2
Gov. cons./absorption 9.9 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7
Gov. total spending/abs. 14.3 14.3 13.9 14.0 13.9 13.9 13.9
Note: For each variable, the \2004" column contains the base year values. GDP and its components
are in billions of lempiras, real GDP per capita is in lempiras, and all ratios are in percentage terms.
Columns 3 through 8 show the average annual growth rates between 2004 and 2016 for GDP and
components, GDP per capita, and the exchange rate. The growth rates are calculated assuming
exponential growth between the rst and the last period. Change in welfare is shown as the absolute
dierence (in millions of 2004 lempiras) between the value of the expenditure function in 2016 in
BaU and in each of the other simulations. Ratios such as trade-to-GDP are shown as values in
2016 for each simulation.
Source: Author's calculations.
household disposable income falls from 17.4 percent to 14.0 percent. Although the \pie" is in fact
smaller in the Isub
BL scenario compared with IBL (real GDP in 2016 in the former is 3 percent lower
than in the latter), the share of the pie allocated to consumption increases enough to oset any
potential losses to consumers and make them better o. This result is unlikely to hold in the long
run, as the reallocation of resources from saving to consumption cannot forever oset the penalty
of slower income growth, but, at least in the time span of our model, replacing domestic investment
with FDI appears to benet consumers. It should be noted, of course, that the utility function
does not include saving and the EV metric is therefore explicitly biased toward producing the above
results. Thus, the eects on welfare in the Isub
BL scenario should be interpreted with caution. At the
same time, this scenario clearly shows that if new FDI simply replaces domestic investment, the
consequences for growth can be negative.
As before, the implementation of DR-CAFTA among all signatories (IML) results in much larger
welfare gains than in the bilateral CAFTA scenario (IBL). Welfare improvements in the former
reach 2.38 percent of GDP in the nal year, although the dierence between the IML and IBL
scenarios is much less pronounced than between simulations that did not consider an increase in
foreign investment inows (CBL and CML). This is due to the fact that the increase in investment
37ows is the same across both simulations, and, as shown above, faster growth in net FDI inows
accounts for the majority of welfare gains in the investment scenarios. In the IML scenario, growth
in exports and imports accelerates signicantly relative to both BaU and IBL, and the trade-to-
GDP ratio reaches its highest value yet (one percentage point above the CML simulation). Trade
diversion is very small in this simulation, with imports from the US and the rest of DR-CAFTA
rising by 20,427 million lempiras, while imports from the EU and the rest of the world fall by only
5,166 million lempiras.
The outcomes of the IL
BL scenario are summarized in the nal column of Table 10. Since the
changes in trade prices are identical to the IBL simulation, it is not surprising that the trade-to-
GDP ratio as well as growth in exports and imports are virtually the same across the two scenarios.
Welfare gains reach 2.23 percent of GDP in the nal year, but as mentioned earlier, their exact
magnitude is uncertain because it depends on the value of the 'fdi parameter. Nonetheless, it is
worth pointing out that the welfare improvement in this scenario is signicantly above the gains
observed in IBL and reaches 93.5 percent of the gains in the IML simulation, due entirely to a 0.05
percent boost in annual labor productivity growth. Although the additional growth in real GDP
per capita is not very large (0.04 percent per year over and above the growth experienced in the
IBL simulation), these results suggest that the realization of even minor technological spillovers
could result in large improvements in welfare in Honduras.
7.3 Sectoral results
Having discussed the macroeconomic outcomes of the foreign direct investment simulations, we now
turn to examining their eects on exports, imports, and production volumes at the sectoral level.
These developments, presented as percent changes from BaU volumes, are summarized in Table
11. Since the pattern of trade liberalization is the same across scenarios that envision increased net
FDI inows and those that do not, all of the points emphasized in section 6.3 remain applicable
here. In addition, two more factors drive the results of this sub-section. First, the increase in FDI
is sector-biased, and therefore some sectors benet much more than others. Second, the behavior
of the real exchange rate (Dutch disease) adds another layer of complexity to the analysis, although
the pressure on the real exchange rate is small in aggregate terms. Since most of the new action
(compared to the trade simulations) takes place on the factor supply side in heavily export-oriented
sectors, it makes sense to begin the analysis by considering the changes in sectoral exports rst.
The largest increases in exports in the IBL scenario are observed in textiles, food, beverages, and
tobacco, coee, and bananas. As mentioned in section 4.3, textiles and food, beverages, and tobacco
are the only sectors facing signicant trade barriers in the US, and increased export prices, combined
with large inows of foreign capital, allow export volumes to rise by 162 and 57 percent relative to
BaU, respectively. Although there are no taris on bananas and coee in the US (and therefore no
change in world prices), exports of these commodities rise by as much as food/beverages/tobacco
(in percentage terms) for two reasons. First, both bananas and coee are very export intensive
(exports are 90 and 98 percent of total production, respectively) and second, they are both fairly
intensive in their use of foreign capital, which accounts for 52 and 39 percent of total value added,
respectively. Therefore, producers are able to signicantly expand their output and send a lion's
share of that output abroad. Unlike textiles and food, beverages, and tobacco, however, there is
little change in the allocation of these new exports across trading partners. Since world prices
remain unchanged, the distribution of exports is largely determined by the initial shares (Table 4),
which means that most of the bananas are destined for the US markets while the majority of new







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39The other FDI-target sectors|wood and mining|experience smaller changes in export volumes.
This is determined by the fact that the outward orientation of these sectors is lower (77 and
56 percent, respectively) while the world prices faced by producers of these commodities remain
unchanged. Exports in most other sectors experience much smaller increases or even decline relative
to BaU volumes. The latter is a result of a more pronounced real exchange rate appreciation in the
IBL scenario, combined with faster growth in domestic incomes. Increased domestic demand and
a slight loss in external competitiveness motivate domestic producers to sell a larger share of their
output domestically, which leads to a lower supply of exports. Overall, export volumes in the IBL
simulation rise by 55 percent more than in CBL, with agricultural exports accounting for a larger
share of the dierence than exports in manufacturing.
Gains in total production in IBL outpace those observed in the CBL scenario by a factor of
more than 4. With the exception of construction, the largest increases occur in the FDI-target
sectors. The distribution of production gains across the FDI-target sectors is directly proportional
to the share of capital in total value added: the higher this share, the more pronounced the gains in
output. On the imports side, the changes are determined both by falling trade barriers and by the
increased demand for intermediate inputs (some which are imported) by the sectors experiencing
large production gains. For example, imports of metals, minerals, and machinery rise by 3 times
as much as they do in the CBL scenario, due, to a large extent, to the fact that this sector is both
very import-intensive and the relevant commodity is highly demanded in the FDI-target sectors.
This occurs despite the fact that imports of metals, minerals, and machinery from the US face the
second lowest tari in Honduras and therefore experience a relatively minor price shock. Overall,
import volumes in the IBL simulation rise by approximately 3 times as much as in the CBL scenario,
and most of the increases in imports can be attributed to the eects of faster growth in the foreign
capital stock. This becomes evident when comparing the IBL and I00 columns; the increase in FDI
inows in the latter simulation (i.e., without any changes in trade prices) accounts for 69 percent
of the change in total imports observed in the former scenario.
As expected, production gains in the Isub
BL simulation are much more mild than in the IBL
scenario, and are almost exclusively concentrated in the FDI-target sectors. Although consumer
demand in the Isub
BL simulation is higher than in BaU or IBL, the reallocation of investment toward
the FDI-target sectors limits the growth opportunities in the remaining sectors. As a result, the nal
year CPI is higher in the Isub
BL scenario than in IBL, while output growth is signicantly slower.
At the sectoral level, slower growth in the domestic capital stock is exacerbated by increased
import competition, which is another factor leading to smaller gains in output. Slower growth
of output (relative to the IBL scenario) and increased consumption demand result in a much less
marked expansion of export volumes. The dierences between Isub
BL and IBL on the exports side,
however, are limited almost entirely to the behavior of agricultural sectors while export volumes of
manufactured goods rise by the same amount. This occurs because agricultural FDI-target sectors
account for less than one-quarter of total output in agriculture and the lack of investment in the
remaining sectors limits their ability to increase output, including output sold abroad. On the
imports side, the increase in total imports in the Isub
BL scenario is only 56 percent of the change
observed in the IBL simulation. However, agricultural imports increase by 40 percent more than
in the IBL scenario, while the increase in manufacturing imports is 4 times smaller than observed
in IBL. This happens because manufactured goods are a large component of intermediate demand,
which is lower due to slower growth of output. On the other hand, agricultural commodities are
mainly a nal demand item and this, combined with lower output of several agriculture sectors due
to falling domestic investment, leads to rising imports of farm products (particularly non-traditional
40and domestic crops).
As before, the implementation of DR-CAFTA across all parties to the agreement results in more
pronounced changes in imports, exports, and domestic production. Unlike the IBL simulation, the
IML scenario favors the producers of manufactured goods, which is consistent with the pattern of
protection faced by Honduran exporters in the DR-CAFTA markets. With the exception of wood
and food, beverages, and tobacco, none of the FDI-target sectors face signicant taris in the rest
of DR-CAFTA (excluding the US), which explains why output and exports in the remaining FDI-
target sectors do not experience large changes between the IBL and IML scenarios. One exception to
this observation is mining, which expands both its exports and production without any additional
changes in export prices. This occurs because this sector intensively uses metals, minerals, and
machinery as an intermediate input. While only 13 percent of total imports of this commodity
(metals, minerals, and machinery) comes from the rest of DR-CAFTA, it is protected by a fairly
high tari, and the elimination of this tari provides a large boost to the mining sector.
The pattern of changes in sectoral output in the IL
BL scenario is similar to that observed in
IBL, which is not surprising since border price changes are the same across the two simulations.
At the same time, the manufacturing and service sectors benet relatively more than agriculture,
where changes in production are almost the same as in the IBL simulation. There are several
reasons for this outcome. On the one hand, labor productivity in agriculture is exogenous and
agriculture tends to be less labor-intensive than manufacturing and services (see Table 5). Both
of these factors lead to faster growth of output in the non-farm sectors. On the other hand, the
agricultural sectors also benet from increasing capital productivity, while capital productivity in
other activities remains xed at base year levels (recall that both capital and labor productivity
in agriculture grow exogenously). Since the FDI-target sectors include both farm and non-farm
activities, farm activities are able to reap additional benets from capital productivity growth. In
the nal outcome, growth of agricultural production remains above the growth in production of
manufacturing, although the dierential between the growth of output in the two aggregate sectors
is reduced relative to the IBL scenario.
7.4 Factor markets
The nal piece of analysis of the FDI simulations is the evolution of factor prices, which is summa-
rized in Table 12. These developments dier somewhat from factor price changes shown in Table
8 due to the dierent specication of the capital and land markets. First, consider the behavior of
factor prices in the BaU scenario. The rate of return on foreign capital falls much more rapidly
than the rental rate on domestic capital despite the fact that both foreign and domestic capital
stocks grow at approximately the same rate (4.3 percent per year). The reason for this behavior
lies in the dierent intensities of dierent types of capital by sector. In BaU, consumers spend a
growing portion of their income on products with high income elasticities, in particular services,
while the share of income spent on purchases of food and light manufacturing items declines. Since
foreign capital is used exclusively in the production of the latter group of commodities, demand for
foreign capital falls over time and the rental rate declines. Intuitively, one may think of the foreign
capital owners willingness to continue investing in Honduras (despite the falling rate of return to
their capital) as indicative of the large initial gap between the rental rate in capital-scarce Honduras
and capital-rich source countries.48
The behavior of economy-wide wages in the BaU scenario can be explained using the same logic
48The initial dierential is not observed in Table 12 because the rental rates are normalized.
41Table 12: Initial Levels and Changes in Factor Prices and Migration, FDI Scenarios
2004 BaU IBL I00 Isub
BL IML IL
BL
Non-farm unskilled wage 37.13 0.64 0.96 0.85 0.62 1.10 0.99
Non-farm skilled wage 59.56 1.39 1.76 1.59 1.43 1.79 1.80
Farm unskilled wage 6.16 0.14 0.17 0.27 0.13 0.51 0.21
Farm skilled wage 10.16 0.12 0.09 0.25 0.11 0.43 0.13
Unskilled migration 7893 0.50 0.78 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.78
Skilled migration 504 1.27 1.66 1.34 1.31 1.36 1.66
Average unskilled wage 23.45 1.08 1.38 1.29 1.06 1.53 1.41
Average skilled wage 54.51 1.45 1.82 1.66 1.49 1.85 1.86
Average tertiary skilled wage 125.12 1.65 2.07 1.96 1.11 2.27 2.09
Average domestic capital real rent 1.00 -0.05 0.24 0.16 1.66 0.41 0.29
Average foreign capital real rent 1.00 -0.93 -7.27 -7.68 -7.63 -6.98 -7.23
Note: For each variable, the \2004" column contains the base year values. Wages are reported in
thousands of lempiras, and rural-to-urban migration in number of workers. The real rental rate is
normalized to one in the base year. Columns 3 through 8 show the average annual growth rates between
2004 and 2016 for each of the variables, in percentage terms. The growth rates are calculated assuming
exponential growth between the rst and the last period.
Source: Author's calculations.
as in section 6.4. Manufacturing and particularly services are relatively more skill-intensive, and
as demand for these commodities rises faster than aggregate demand, skilled and tertiary-skilled
workers become more scarce and earn higher wages. In fact, the evolution of wages by skill level is
virtually identical between the BaU scenarios of Table 12 and Table 8. Similarly, growth in wages
paid to non-farm workers in BaU is also very similar. On the other hand, growth in agricultural
wages is about half what was recorded in the baseline with only one type of capital. This is due to
the fact that producers in these sectors nd it advantageous to substitute capital for labor due to
the falling rental rate of foreign capital, which is used intensively in these sectors. As a result, there
is less labor demand in agriculture, farm wages grow slower, and inter-sectoral migration rises.
In the IBL scenario, the accelerated pace of foreign direct investment inows leads to a signicant
decline in the rental rate of foreign capital, which is now more abundant. The fall in the rental
rate is somewhat oset by increased demand for the output of FDI-target sectors due to trade
liberalization (compare the rental rates of foreign capital between the IBL and I00) columns, but
this additional demand is not sucient to signicantly counterbalance the relative abundance of
foreign capital. On the other hand, the returns to more scarce domestic capital rise over time.
Since the production volumes of both agriculture and manufacturing rise signicantly rela-
tive to BaU, wage growth in both segments of the labor increases. However, the acceleration is
more pronounced for the wages of non-farm workers because production in the largest employer
of farm labor|domestic crops|declines relative to BaU. As was the case in the CBL scenario,
tertiary-skilled workers gain the most in this simulation, followed by skilled and unskilled employ-
ees. Therefore, wage inequality, at least at the level of labor market detail considered in this paper,
is likely to rise with DR-CAFTA. Furthermore, gains to non-farm workers signicantly outpace the
wage growth of farm employees.
Allowing FDI to be a substitute, rather than a complement, for domestic investment consid-
erably limits the wage gains from trade liberalization and increased FDI. In fact, growth rates of
sectoral and economy-wide wages as well as inter-sectoral migration are remarkably similar between
42Isub
BL and BaU. This result is not particularly surprising since production volume changes in this
scenario are much more muted than in the simulations considered above, which leads to lower labor
demand and less upward pressure on wages. The decline in the foreign capital rental rate is more
pronounced than in the IBL scenario (again due to lower production and demand), while returns
to domestic capital rise signicantly.
In the IML scenario, production volumes of both agriculture and manufacturing rise relative
to IBL, although additional gains in manufacturing output (68 percent) are much larger than in
agriculture (16 percent). As a result, growth in non-farm wages accelerates. The most noticeable
dierence is a more than doubling of the growth rate of farm wages, which occurs due to the fact
that production of domestic crops is no longer falling. At the economy-wide level, the biggest
winners in this scenario (relative to BaU) are still tertiary-skilled workers, although the second
place now goes to unskilled labor.
In the IL
BL simulation, growth in economy-wide wages is only marginally faster than in the
IBL scenario. This result is an outcome of two factors. On the one hand, workers are paid their
marginal product and therefore increased productivity raises labor earnings. On the other hand,
less workers are needed for any given increase in output, which reduces growth in labor demand.
This can be seen in the behavior of capital rental rates, which grow faster (or decline slower) in
this simulation relative to IBL. Since labor productivity in agriculture remains unchanged, labor
demand in the farm sectors rises relative to others, which explains the faster growth in farm wages.
However, since growth in non-farm wages also accelerates, migration remains the same as in the
IBL scenario.
8 Conclusions
The negotiations on DR-CAFTA were started with high expectations for the ability of the agree-
ment to help the developing country members transition from a decade of poor growth performance
to sustained improvements in income and welfare. In order to assess the likelihood of these posi-
tive developments, this paper has analyzed the likely patterns of adjustments to DR-CAFTA for
Honduras with a dynamic CGE model. Several key messages emerge from the analysis. First, the
welfare gains from bilateral tari reform with the US are likely to be very modest, less than 0.1
percent of GDP. This is due to the fact that very little additional market opening takes place in
the US, while Honduran producers face increased import competition and the government must
make up the budgetary shortfall from lower tari revenues by raising taxes or limiting spending.
These welfare gains are much smaller than the estimates reported in the previous studies, which
range from 0.5 to 4.5 percent of GDP. One of the reasons for smaller welfare gains in this paper is
the use of much more recent (2004 vs. 2001 or 1997) tari data, which means that the marginal
reduction in protection considered in this paper is considerably lower than what the earlier liter-
ature used. Furthermore, the gains estimated in this paper are specic to Honduras, rather than
the Central America average considered in the previous studies. In addition, rather than removing
all protection at once, the modeling approach in this paper takes into account the gradual phase-in
of tari reductions as well as product exclusions and the dierent reduction schedules by sector
(agriculture vs. manufacturing). Finally, we do not consider the implications of the liberalization
of trade in services, which could potentially lead to larger gains, due to diculties in quantifying
service barriers.
The second message is that bilateral tari reform favors agricultural producers of export crops,
while manufacturing output rises less and production of domestic-oriented agriculture actually
43declines. These results dier from studies focusing on Central America as a whole (e.g., Francois
et al., 2005), which argue that the largest increases in production are likely to take place in the
textiles and apparel sector, but are consistent with the analysis of Bussolo and Niimi (2006) for
Nicaragua, where agricultural production tends to increase more. This suggests that the outcomes
for the poorest members of DR-CAFTA|Honduras and Nicaragua|are likely to dier substantially
from the aggregate results for Central America. The sectoral results imply that trade reform is likely
to be particularly benecial for owners of capital and land, while unskilled workers gain the least
and unskilled workers in the farm sector actually lose. Although the analysis is not accompanied by
micro-simulations that could translate the changes in factor returns and consumption prices into
poverty outcomes, the marginal eects of preferential liberalization under DR-CAFTA are unlikely
to be benecial for the poor, who tend to earn most of their income from unskilled labor and are
usually concentrated in the agriculture sector. Furthermore, wage inequality is likely to rise, at
least at the level of labor market detail considered in this paper. Ultimately, however, the eects
on poverty and inequality will depend on the presence and design of complementary policies.
The third message is that the implementation of DR-CAFTA throughout all partner countries
leads to signicantly larger welfare gains of 0.7 percent of GDP. Furthermore, the \multilateral"
DR-CAFTA scenario benets manufacturing production relatively more than farm output, and
results in an acceleration of growth in farm and non-farm wages alike.49 The fourth, and related,
message is that while neither of the DR-CAFTA liberalization scenarios is fully consistent with
the pattern of sectoral adjustment that is likely to occur under a global free trade scenario, the
\multilateral" DR-CAFTA is much more congruent with full liberalization than a bilateral DR-
CAFTA with the US. In other words, the bilateral DR-CAFTA attracts labor to sectors that are
likely to expand relatively less under global free trade and, should further global liberalization take
place (such as the successful conclusion of the Doha Round talks), Honduras may be faced with
signicant adjustment costs as movement of labor across sectors is rarely frictionless.
The fth, and perhaps most important, message is that the potential gains from non-trade
channels potentially overwhelm the likely gains from tari liberalization alone. The provisions
of DR-CAFTA include a signicant scope for the liberalization of investment ows between the
members of the agreement. If DR-CAFTA leads to an increase in net FDI inows roughly compared
to that experienced by Mexico in the rst three years following the implementation of NAFTA,
welfare gains from just the bilateral reform could rise to 1.9 percent of GDP by 2016. If the new FDI
under DR-CAFTA is able to generate positive productivity spillovers for the domestic economy|
whether through knowledge transfers, backward linkages, or trade capacity building|welfare gains
could rise further to 2.2 percent of GDP. Therefore, the numerical simulations in this paper suggest
that investment, rather than trade, is the key to maximizing benets from preferential liberalization
in Honduras.
The results suggest that while some doubts about DR-CAFTA have not been baseless, the
agreement can be an important part of the development strategy of Honduras. We identify several
areas for policy attention by the government of Honduras (and potentially the international com-
munity) in order to maximize the potential of DR-CAFTA. First, policy makers should recognize
that most trade barriers are likely to be found among the developing trading partners and thus
focus their attention on obtaining improved market access to countries where the trade benets
are likely to be signicant (such as the CACM partners). This is consistent with the analysis of
Medvedev (2006b), which showed that North-North PTAs have no statistically signicant eect
on trade, while the largest trade creation eects were observed for South-South PTAs. Second,
49Capital and land are still the biggest winners in this scenario, however.
44although Honduras is likely to receive little by way of additional market access to the US, the ben-
ets of \deep integration" with high income partners could be large. The estimates in Medvedev
(2006a) showed that the ex post relationship between preferential liberalization and increased net
FDI inows is driven by North-South and South-South PTAs, and the magnitude of the expected
FDI benets is increasing in the incomes of PTA partners. Thus, a properly implemented \deep
integration" agreement with the US could result in large net FDI inows and, as the results of this
paper show, substantial welfare gains. Therefore, Honduran policy makers should do their best to
exploit the provisions of DR-CAFTA to attract new FDI into the country. Under these conditions,
the agreement could result in welfare gains that are orders of magnitude above the welfare increases
from bilateral trade reform alone.
It should be emphasized that these benets are not certain, however, and that DR-CAFTA also
presents a number of challenges to the Honduran policy makers. First, the budgetary implications of
tari reform need to be carefully considered. If the government is to follow through on its ambitious
plans to attain many of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015, it will need to replace the
lost tari revenue by alternative tax collection mechanisms. Additional borrowing is unlikely to be
feasible given the current debt situation, but raising taxes presents other challenges. Indirect taxes
tend to shift the burden onto poorer households, while direct taxes may be more dicult to collect.
In the absence of these eorts, public spending may need to be cut, which could jeopardize the
progress on the human development agenda as well as inhibit some of the policies Honduras needs
to attract the potential FDI, such as investments in education and infrastructure. Second, the
potential widening of wage inequality following trade reform may erode support for future reforms
as well as increase the demand for public services that help workers adjust to these shocks, such as
additional investment in education, job training, and social safety nets. Third, the sequencing of
policy reforms also requires the attention of policymakers. This paper has shown that the pattern
of structural changes implied by DR-CAFTA (especially when the agreement is implemented as a
hub-and-spoke arrangement) may not be consistent with Honduras' comparative advantages under
free trade and, should multilateral free trade talks advance, additional costly labor adjustments
may need to take place. Even in the absence of global free trade, improved market access of,
for example, Chinese textiles producers could be quite detrimental to Honduran exporters. Thus,
Honduras should prioritize the pursuit of additional liberalization vis- a-vis other trading partners to
more closely align the sectors that receive preferential access with the sectors where it has a global
comparative advantage.50 Fourth, maximizing the potential investment benets from DR-CAFTA
may require additional investments in infrastructure, education, health, sanitation, public safety,
etc., to create an investment climate conducive not only to attracting FDI, but also to encouraging
horizontal and backward linkages between foreign aliates and domestic rms. However, this is
likely to make the public revenue constraints even more binding.
It is important to acknowledge that, although the motivation behind this paper is to examine
the likely eects of DR-CAFTA on the economy of Honduras, the simulations and their results
should not be taken as forecasts of the future performance of Honduras under DR-CAFTA. The
CGE model in this paper is not a forecasting tool; rather, it is a consistent framework for examining
the transmission of trade liberalization shocks through the economy of Honduras. Any number of
internal and external shocks could result in future outcomes signicantly dierent from the results
of this paper; however, the transmission mechanisms identied here are likely to remain valid and
50The same point applies to the transition from a hub-and-spoke DR-CAFTA arrangement to a comprehensive
regional agreement, suggesting that the longer full implementation is delayed, the longer Honduras moves in the
\wrong" direction.
45the relative pattern of gains and losses is likely to hold. Furthermore, many of the closure rules
adopted in our analysis (xed current account, xed government decit, exible real exchange rate
that augments the direct eects of the DR-CAFTA tari reductions on exports) may not be very
realistic, but they have the benet of generating consistent welfare outcomes that are comparable
with other studies instead of \leakages" out of the system (e.g., with no transversality condition,
the public sector can freely accumulate debt with no eects on the macroeconomy). Similarly,
the baseline scenario constructed in this paper is very smooth, almost steady-state. While this
unlikely to reect reality, this assumption allows us to focus the analysis on the relevant provisions
of DR-CAFTA by keeping the sources of variability tightly controlled.
While the results of this paper address many questions about the likely eects of DR-CAFTA
on Honduras, many others remain for future research. One possible direction is locating data
that would enable a researcher to conduct a more careful analysis of factor returns, such as more
detailed data on land and capital by region of ownership. Also, the ndings of this paper could be
complemented with careful micro-simulation analysis to link the sectoral and macroeconomic results
to poverty and distributional outcomes at the household level. Given the importance of external
migration in the labor market dynamics of Honduras, the consequences of changing incentives to
migrate internationally (most likely to the US) could also be investigated. Finally, more explicit
modeling of the role of foreign capital in domestic production could help identify and quantify
various channels of transmission of FDI shocks. These avenues would allow for a more nuanced
understanding of the eects of preferential liberalization on the economy of Honduras.
46A CES aggregation of Armington demand with non-unitary in-
come elasticities
The Armington system of product dierentiation by region of origin is implemented by aggregating
demand for imported and domestically produced commodities into a composite good. In many
CGE models, this is done by means of the CES functional form (often nested to allow for dierent
substitution possibilities), while others use more exible translog aggregation functions, such as
the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The main
advantages of the exible functional forms include the ability to capture a wide variety of own-
and cross-price elasticities, as well as allowing for income elasticities dierent from unity. However,
the added exibility comes at the cost of increased model size and diculties in calibration, which
cannot be done through simple matrix inversion and requires the user to set up an optimization
problem. As an alternative, this section follows van der Mensbrugghe (2005b) to develop a simple
extension to the standard CES aggregation which allows the income elasticities to deviate from
unity. This is accomplished by adding shift parameters to the aggregation function|a modication
similar to the set up of the LES system.
Consider the following representation of Armington demand:
XA = (bd (XD   d)




where XD and XM are the demanded quantities of domestically produced and imported goods,
respectively. The  parameters are often thought of as consumption oors or subsistence minimums,
although there is no theoretical requirement that any of these parameters be positive. If both of the
 parameters are set to zero, the expression (5) collapses to the standard CES specication. The
expenditure on domestic and foreign goods is limited by the total value of the Armington bundle,
giving rise to the following budget constraint:
PAXA = PDXD + PMXM (6)
The rst order condition for XD is:
bdXA1  (XD   d)
 1   PD = 0 (7)
After re-arranging, the demand functions for XD and XM are as follows:
XD = d + dPD  XA (8)
XM = m + mPM  XA (9)
where  = (1   ) 1 is the elasticity of substitution and i = b
i 8i 2 [d;m]. Inserting these
equations into the budget constraint (6) and re-arranging yields the following:
 XA =
PAXA   dPD   mPM
dPD1  + mPM1  (10)
We can now derive the Marshallian demands by inserting this expression into equations (8) and
(9) above:
XD = d + dPD PAXA   dPD   mPM
dPD1  + mPM1  (11)
47XM = m + mPM PAXA   dPD   mPM
dPD1  + mPM1  (12)
These expressions can be simplied further by solving for the Armington price PA. First, insert
them into the original Armington aggregation function (5) to obtain the following:
XA = (PAXA   dPD   mPM)
 
dPD1  + mPM1  1
 1 (13)












dPD1  + mPM1  1
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dPD1  + mPM1  1
1  (15)
Using this expression, we can simplify the Marshallian demand equations (11) and (12):













































These expressions are the same as income elasticities for the CES aggregation function, but they
do not collapse to unity as long as the  parameters remain dierent from zero.51
Calibration of this extended CES setup cannot be done through simple matrix inversion because
the system is under-determined. Starting from initial estimates of the elasticity of substitution 
and the income elasticities , the  parameters can be calibrated by inverting equations (18)
and (19). The Marshallian demand equations (16) and (17) can then be used to solve for the
 parameters. However, equations (18) and (19) are not independent because the budget shares
must sum to one from the constraint (6). A simple solution is to x one of the  parameters|in
the current setup, d is assumed to be zero, therefore implicitly setting the income elasticity for
domestically produced goods to unity.




XM ratios from equations (16) and (17).
48B SAM accounts
Table 13: Microeconomic SAM Accounts














met Metals, minerals, machinery
oma Other manufacturing




Factors of lab-n Unskilled labor
production lab-s Skilled labor
lab-t Tertiary-skilled labor




Current and xca Rest of CACM and Dominican Republic
capital eun European Union (EU-15)
accounts usa United States
xrw Rest of the World
bop Balance of payments
Taxes dirtx Direct taxes




Investment invst Private investment
ginvst Public investment
delst Change in stocks
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